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The international syndication of venture capital investments has become an increasingly 
widespread phenomenon, but there is a lack of research which applies the already limited 
prior international research in this field1 to South Africa or other African countries.  This 
research aims to begin that discussion, and take the first step in filling that gap of 
understanding.   The main research questions addressed in this study:  are local venture 
capital practitioners ready and willing to syndicate internationally, and what are the 
constraints to the formation of those transactions?  The issues were examined by 
interviewing high level investment practitioners representing seven of the 21 non-
governmental VC firms belonging to the South African Venture Capital Associated (SAVCA). 
This data were influenced and shaped by other available sources of primary and secondary 
data.  The results indicate that South African venture capital investors are ready and willing 
to syndicate internationally, however there are caveats to that broad statement which the 
ensuing analysis addresses.  Additionally, it was found that there are significant and 
profound constraints to these transactions forming in South Africa.  Those constraints are an 
unsupportive regulatory environment, negative perceptions by the international investor 
community of South Africa, small domestic deal sizes and the dearth of bankable ventures 
led by high quality management teams. Options for further research include a study of the 
attitudes of potential foreign VC professional partners to the option of syndication involving 
South African VC firms, and a more in depth investigation into the risks and constraints to 









                                                          
1
 The international research on venture capital syndication mainly speaks to the benefits and driver of venture 
capital syndication, and not so much to the readiness of the venture capital of a specific country to syndicate. 
See Schertler & Tykvova (2012), Makela & Maula (2005), Makela & Maula (2008), Hursti & Maula (2007), and 
Jaaskelainnen & Maula (2005) for examples of key studies related to the above. 
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The venture capital2 industry in South Africa is nascent, and that may be a generous 
description.  The funds and investment companies which do purport to operate in the space 
make few investments, often have limited track records, and as a whole have yet to exhibit 
a sustained ability to generate returns and results for investors.   Providing support for those 
statements are data from a 2012 report (SAVCA & Venture Solutions, 2012) which showed 
that from the years 2009 to 2012 there were a total of 103 venture capital investments with 
a total value of ca. USD 83mn3.   As a point of comparison, in 2012 alone the US had 3,698 
venture capital transactions with a total value of ca. USD 26.5bn (PWC & NVCA, 2013). 
 
Local researchers have assessed the industry and its deficiencies, and their analyses (Jones, 
2009; Lingelbach et al., 2009) provide fodder for this research as it unpacks one important 
potentially ameliorative phenomenon, that being the international syndication of venture 
capital investments4 in South Africa.   
 
When investing in ventures abroad, complexities arise due to different legislations, 
languages, cultures and long distances between the investors and portfolio companies 
(Makela & Maula, 2006; Fritsch & Schilder, 2008).  The complexities, or liabilities of 
foreignness, are often amplified with early stage investments due to the inherent need of 
those investments for more support and guidance, relative to larger private equity deals 
which typically invest into much more established and profitable businesses (Clarysse et. al, 
2007; Zahra et al., 2007).  To deal with these complexities, international syndicates are 
sometimes formed.  Having a strong local investor in the consortium is important as they 
can more effectively monitor the investment, and provide other support which could 
                                                          
2
 Venture capital, for purposes of this research, is defined as it is defined in the 2012 SAVCA Venture Solutions 
VC Survey.  That definition is that it is “a subset of the private equity asset class which deals with 
predominantly equity funding of high tech, high growth-potential businesses, whose growth is typically 
achieved through radical global scaling.  The need for venture capital stems from the specific requirements of 
such businesses in the start-up and early growth phases, and the part that experienced venture capital fund 
managers can play in structuring and nurturing investments into these businesses.” 
3
 Assuming a 10 to 1 exchange rate with the South African Rand. 
4
 Throughout this research report and in other research in this field, international syndication and investing are 
also referred to as cross-border syndication and investing. 
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otherwise be too expensive to provide from afar (Wright & Lockett, 2003; Makela & Maula, 
2008; Sapienza, 1992).  
 
Internationally syndicated venture capital investments are in theory simple transactions.  
The parties involved are a foreign investor, co-investing with a local investor5 into a local 
venture and/or management team.  The benefits, drivers, roles and risks of these 
transactions have received some recent attention, and those findings are outlined in the 
literature review in Chapter 2.  For South African early-stage investors and entrepreneurs, 
understanding how these transactions work and how they can be facilitated are important, 
and the stakes are high.  With international investment comes a quick transfer of risk capital 
and specialized skills from the developed world (Patricof, 1989; Barry, 1994; Bygrave & 
Timmons, 1999).   The international investors also benefit.  From their perspective, investing 
in the South African venture capital asset class is a way to increase geographic diversity in 
their portfolios to reduce systematic risk, and to increase yields.  The increase in yields is 
possible by higher growth rates and reduced levels of competition in many developing 
markets, like South Africa.  A properly structured internationally syndicated venture 
investment can be a win-win proposition for all parties involved. 
 
A major research gap exists in relation to academic analyses which deal with crossing of 
country borders by venture capital firms (Wright et al., 2005).  This research takes steps to 
further close that gap in the international research, and is the first attempt known by this 
researcher to do so in a South African (or African) context.  To begin the discussion and 
analysis of South Africa’s venture capital ecosystem and its suitability for internationally 
syndicated venture investments, the main research questions addressed in this study:  are 
local venture capital practitioners ready and willing to syndicate internationally, and what 
are the constraints to the formation of such transactions? 
 
The issues are critically examined firstly by interviewing a significant proportion of the total 
population of venture capital practitioners in South Africa.  The questions posed, and 
interview structure utilised, were heavily influenced by the existing body of international 
                                                          
5
 In the case of this research, the local investors and ventures are always South African, and the foreign 
investor from any other markets outside of South Africa.   
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research in the field.   Other non-original secondary and primary data were used to shape 
the discussion, frame the issues, and to draw and support conclusions. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
A review of the literature shows that there are several benefits of international syndication 
to both the venture and the investors.  It’s likely that internationally syndicated venture 
transactions, if properly structured, would benefit South African ventures and investors.  
The purpose of this research is to assess why these transactions aren’t more common, and 
to identify whether the local venture capital investors are ready and willing to syndicate 
internationally, and the constraints in South Africa which may be hindering these 
transactions.   
 
1.3 Layout of the Research Report 
The research report is set out as follows:  Chapter 2 is the literature review that describes 
the relevant theories of syndication, and in particular, international syndication.  Chapter 3 
describes the history, body of academic literature and current state of the South African 
venture capital industry.  Chapter 4 defines and defends the research methodology that was 
used.  Chapter 5 presents the results.  Chapter 6 discusses the results.  Chapter 7 presents 
the conclusion.  Chapter 8 discusses recommendations for future research, and Chapter 9 
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2 Venture Capital industry in South Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
The South African venture capital industry can be traced formally back to the 1980s with the 
formation of the Johannesburg Venture Capital Club (JVCC) in Johannesburg, South Africa.  
Since then, the industry has weathered several storms, including economic isolation over 
global protests to apartheid, the overthrowing of that government and formation of a new 
democratically elected government, the global financial crisis beginning in 2008 and other 
significant events.  The history, current state, and available literature on the South African 
venture capital industry is described in this chapter.  
 
2.2 History of venture capital in South Africa 
 
Table 1: History of venture capital in South Africa 
 
Date Event 
1940 IDC established to fund SMEs and combat poverty in the Afrikaans community 
1981 Business Partners Ltd founded to develop and fund SMEs in Southern Africa 
mid-1980s JVCC established 
1990 JVCC fails 
1992 Technifin venture capital fund launched 
1994 Newly elected ANC dedicates itself to supporting SMEs 
1999 Department of Trade and Industry drafts a national venture capital programme 
2008 
Global financial crisis (AUM in venture capital industry from ZAR 2.6bn in 2007 
to ZAR 700mn in 2009) 
    (Sources: Lingelbach et al. (2009), Technifin website, 2012 Business Partners annual report) 
 
A concise history of the venture capital industry in South Africa is proffered by Lingelbach et 
al. (2009) in The Rise and Fall of South African Venture Capital: A Coproduction Perspective.  
In that, the researchers describe the widespread interest in venture capital in South Africa 
beginning in the mid-1980s with the establishment of the Johannesburg Venture Capital 
Club (JVCC).  The JVCC was led by a South African who was inspired after a visit to the 
United States and witnessing business plans being presented to a venture capital club there.  
The club received support from prominent local law firms, private equity managers, the 
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Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Business Partners.  It ultimately died out by 
1990. 
 
The first formal venture capital fund in South Africa was Technifin, and was founded in 
1992.  Technifin was a joint venture between two state-controlled organizations, the IDC 
and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).  The fund focused on 
commercializing technologies and IP residing in South Africa.  Technifin technically failed in 
the late 1990s, but is still operating as of October, 2013, and primarily licenses IP held in its 
portfolio to domestic and international parties. 
 
Interestingly, Lingelbach et al. (2009) describe that the development of venture capital in 
South Africa has historically been linked to the government’s desire to support small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  Post-apartheid, this support has come largely to foster 
black economic empowerment (BEE) initiatives and to encourage previously disadvantaged 
racial categories or peoples in South Africa to start and run businesses.  For example, the 
iMbewu Fund, administered by the National Empowerment Fund, aims to provide 
entrepreneurial and expansion funding to black-owned businesses in the range of ZAR 
250,000 – ZAR 10,000,000.    
 
Lingelbach et al. (2009) go on to describe that towards the end of apartheid, ownership and 
assets were becoming increasingly concentrated in most sectors, thus squeezing out many 
entrepreneurs, whether they be black, white or other.  In 1994, partially in response, the 
newly elected African National Congress (ANC) party sought to combat the concentration, 
and dedicated itself to providing SME financing to South African businesses.  The 
government focused on greater fiscal prudence, easing monetary policy, and encouraging 
private investment.  Due to these and other factors, the economy experienced sustained 
growth. 
 
In 1999, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) drafted  a national venture capital 
programme which had four recommendations: 1) develop and maintain a venture capital 
infrastructure, 2) encourage and assist entrepreneurs, 3) direct government supported 
research and development, and 4) increase the availability of seed and early-stage capital 
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through the establishment of five venture capital funds modelled on the Australian 
Innovation Investment Fund (IIF), and the encouragement of an active angel network.  
Though not a slam dunk, these resolutions were helpful, and since then the IDC has been 
the primary government funded provider of entrepreneurial capital to South African 
businesses. 
 
According to Lingelbach et al. (2009) it is unclear what progress has been made vis-à-vis the 
South African government’s support of entrepreneurialism and venture capital.  There has 
been virtually no formal evaluation of these initiatives, but the general informal consensus is 
that they have not been successful.  Lerner (2012), in a book titled, Boulevard of Broken 
Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed – and 
What to Do About It, may offer some guidance.  In that he makes a strong case why 
government is not well equipped to make investment selection decisions, and what roles 
they should and can credibly play.  South Africa’s attempts to help the local ecosystem 
largely fall into categories which Lerner deem unfit for government participation, and may 
ultimately have caused more harm than good.   
 
Since the company’s founding, the primary provider of entrepreneurial capital from the 
private sector is Business Partners Ltd.  Business Partners was founded in 1981, and is a 
company which sprung from the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC).  It is 
approximately 20% owned by the South African government.  According to the 2012 Annual 
Report, since its founding, Business Partners has helped finance more than 69,000 
businesses, with total investments of ZAR 12.5bn. 
 
The most recent notable event impacting the South African venture capital industry is the 
global financial crisis.  This table, a replica from the 2012 SAVCA Venture Solutions VC 
Survey shows where the industry was in terms of venture capital transactions leading up to 
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Table 2:  Transactions per year in South Africa, from 2000-2012 (Q2) 
 
         (Source: 2012 SAVCA Venture Solutions VC Survey) 
 
Portman et al. (2013) offer good commentary when explaining the effects of the 2008 global 
financial crisis on the South African private equity and venture capital industries.  Citing the 
KPMG & SAVCA 2010 industry report, Portman explains that from 2007 to 2009 private 
equity activity decreased from ZAR 2.6bn in 2007 to only ZAR 0.7bn in 2009.  He concludes 
that early-stage investors were hurt the worse, relying on a 2009 Deloitte and SAVCA 
confidence survey of South African private equity practitioners which found that less than 5 
percent of those interviewed were investing in early-stage ventures in 2009, down from 40 
percent in 2005.  This conclusion was corroborated by a subsequent KPMG & SAVCA 2010 
report which showed that seed, startup and early-stage investments in South Africa 
declined from ZAR 1.134bn in 2008 to only ZAR 280mn in 2009.  This table shows the figures 
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Table 3:  Effects of financial crisis on SA private equity and venture capital 
  2005 2007 2008 2009 
Total 
Decrease 
Startup and seed 
investment totals (ZAR) 
    1.134bn 0.28bn -75% 
Total Private Equity 
activity (ZAR) 
   2.6bn   0.7bn -73% 
Percent of investors 
investing in early-stage 
ventures 
40%     5% -88% 
(Sources:  2005 and 2009 Deloitte and SAVCA confidence surveys, and KMPG & SAVCA 2008 
and 2010 industry reports) 
 
2.3 Current state of venture capital in South Africa 
South Africa’s venture capital investment activity has recovered slightly from the 
aforementioned 2009 figure of ZAR 280mn.  In 2012, the private equity industry had ZAR 
10.6bn worth of transactions, and 9.3% (or ZAR 1.04bn) of those were in the early-stage, 
seed and startup category (KPMG & SAVCA, 2013).   To put that in perspective, before the 
global 2008 financial crisis, the venture capital industry in South Africa had transactions 
worth ZAR 0.59bn and ZAR 0.9bn in 2005 and 2006, respectively (KPMG & SAVCA, 2006).  
Note from the table below the decrease in percentages of private equity investments 
attributable to early-stage and seed investments from 15 percent in 2006 to 9 percent in 
2012. 
 











2012 10.6bn 9% 668mn 
2006 6bn 15% 585mn 
2005 4.5bn 13% 900mn 
                              (Sources:  2006 and 2013 KPMG & SAVCA industry reports)             
 
Business Partners remains an important and influential provider of startup and expansion 
capital to South African entrepreneurs.  In 2012, the company made 320 (66.1% of total) 
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investments, with an average deal size of ZAR 1.92mn (KPMG & SAVCA, 2013).  This 
represents a substantial portion of all early-stage investments in South Africa.  Business 
Partners has also recently embarked to fund more high-growth and riskier ventures with 
more upside potential through a recently established proprietary venture capital fund which 
it calls the Venture Fund.  As of October, 2013 the fund was sitting on ZAR 400mn of 
committed capital, and had made zero investments. 
 
An additional point to mention is that, although widely seen to be favourable to private 
equity investment in general, the recent changes to Regulation 28, which in South Africa 
regulates the asset class allocations of pension funds, are not likely to have any material 
effect on the local VC industry. Whereas Regulation 28 previously did not clearly stipulate 
maxim private equity allocation for pension funds, the revised version effective from 2011 
allows for investment in private equity of up to 10% of pension fund assets under 
management. However, given the very high risk of venture capital investments, it is 
extremely unlikely that South African pension funds, who are already quite risk averse, will 
invest in this asset class anytime soon. 
 
2.4 Academic literature on the South African industry 
There is a limited body of research on the venture capital industry in South Africa, and none 
of significance dealing with other African countries which this researcher could find.  All of 
the research known to this researcher dealing with the South African venture capital 
ecosystem is briefly summarized herein.  Although not directly relevant to this research on 
international syndication, many of the findings from prior research are edifying. 
 
A longitudinal case study of the South African venture capital industry was conducted by 
Lingelbach et al. (2009) titled, The Rise and Fall of South African Venture Capital:  A 
Coproduction Perspective.  The data sets used to draw conclusions were from interviews, 
direct observations, and prior academic and industry research.  By looking at the venture 
capital industry’s rise and fall (as they termed it) from 1980 to 2008, they shed light on what 
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causes venture capital to thrive in countries with weak institutional environments (WIEs) 
where regulatory barriers are high and property rights insecure.6   
 
The simultaneity explanation of venture capital emergence states that the industry springs 
to life when three factors are sufficiently present:  pools of capital, specialized financial 
institutions and entrepreneurs (Gilson, 2003).  In South Africa, the researchers argued that 
post-apartheid, all three of these conditions were present yet the venture capital industry 
collapsed.  Coproduction was the model these researchers created through which to analyse 
and understand the South African industry, and this model looked largely at the relationship 
between government actors and entities, and venture capital practitioners.  They argued 
that this model was appropriate for South Africa, a country where the government was 
largely responsible for providing seed capital and funding activities which would otherwise 
be funded through private actors in more developed economies.  They attributed the 
collapse in the local venture capital industry to weakening ties (or embeddedness) between 
the private sector (mostly white) and public sector (mostly black) actors, post-apartheid.  
 
That same year, Lingelbach (2009) also looked at the South African venture capital industry 
in, Neither Pirates nor Politicos:  The Emergence of Venture Capital in Weak Institutional 
Environments.  Chapter 4 of that research deals exclusively with South Africa’s venture 
capital market, and delivers the findings in a case study format.  In that, he discusses the 
aforementioned coproduction perspective of venture capital emergence in South Africa, and 
describes the industry (including the private equity industry) and state of information in 
2008 and before quite thoroughly.  Interesting and edifying comparative data are presented 
showing the state of other emerging market venture capital industries, relative to South 
Africa. 
 
Van Deventer (2009), published a piece in the South African Journal of Business 
Management titled, Factors influencing venture capitalists’ project financing decisions in 
South Africa.  The study explored and identified the investment criteria used by South 
African venture capitalists in their venture screening and evaluation processes.  A Lickert 
                                                          
6
 South Africa was considered a WIE in Lingelbach’s research. 
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scale questionnaire was used to gather the data from which conclusions were drawn.  It was 
found that South African venture capitalists consider the entrepreneur’s honesty and 
integrity, a good expected market acceptance, and a high IRR to be the three most 
important criteria. 
 
The questionnaires were sent to the 16 SAVCA members who qualified as venture capital 
firms under their definition, and 12 completed surveys.  Essentially, this was the same 
questionnaire which has also been administered in the US and Europe in prior studies.  It 
was concluded that the South African and foreign venture investors are similar in how they 
make venture project finance decisions. 
 
In 2013, as a follow-up study to Van Deventer (2009), Portmann published a piece in the 
South African Journal of Economics and Management Sciences titled, Private Equity and 
Venture Capital is South Africa:  A Comparison of Project Finance Decisions.  An important 
difference between the two is that Portmann’s research is post-financial crisis of 2008, and 
includes private equity firms in the sample.  As expected, both venture capital and private 
equity firms rate the entrepreneurs and management team higher than other criteria, and 
private equity firms rely more on financial data which is usually not available to venture 
capitalists.  The data found a strong shift in focus away from start-up funding and towards 
later-stage deals, indicating a decline in risk appetite among local money managers since the 
2008 study on the venture capital industry. 
 
Lastly, a working paper by Jones (2009) titled, Early-stage venture capital in South Africa:  
Challenges and prospects.  The aim of that research was to assess the factors which impact 
the development of early-stage venture capital in South Africa.  The researchers used an 
online survey, and interviews as sources of data.  The key factors identified which needed 
attention were lack of funds targeting early-stage investments, lack of specialised fund 
managers, and low entrepreneurial skillsets in South Africa.  Recommendations included 
engaging more with angel investors and improving cooperation between the different 
market players in the sector. 
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The research at hand builds upon the prior academic research into the South African 
venture capital industry by firstly offering a pragmatic analysis of a possible solution to the 
problems which the other researchers on South Africa’s venture capital industry have 
highlighted with aplomb.  This is the first research in South Africa on a possible ameliorative 
solution in the local ecosystem, and also the first research on the local ecosystem through 
an international investment lens.  There is a bourgeoning body of academic literature 
coming out of several countries which describes the relatively young phenomenon of the 
international syndication of venture investments, and this piece is the first to incorporate 
that literature into a South African context.  In so doing, this research fills gaps both in the 
South African research, and in the international body of research around international 
syndication.   
3 Literature Review on Domestic and Cross-
Border Venture Capital Syndication 
3.1 Introduction 
The following literature review defines syndication in a venture capital context, and 
discusses the benefits, drivers and other features of this phenomenon.  Also discussed are 
the unique benefits, drivers, constraints, risks and party roles in internationally syndicated 
venture capital transactions. 
3.2 Syndication in general (domestic and international) 
Venture capitalists often co-invest with one another, much like bankers syndicate 
commercial loans.  In the venture capital context, syndication is where two or more venture 
capitalists take an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture with the expectations of 
collaborating to produce a joint payoff (Wilson, 1968).  Early research on returns of 
syndicated investments in the US show that over 50% of all venture capital investments are 
syndicated, and often with one investor playing the part as lead investor which usually 
entails shouldering the bulk of the monitoring and support functions (Wright & Lockett, 
2003).   A more recent study in 2009 by Dimov and Milanov found that in 2,498 venture 
capital investments in the US from 1980 to 2004, 73% of those first round investments were 
syndicated.  In Europe, the typical rate of syndication is between 40% and 50%, with the UK 
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having a lower than normal rate of only 18% in 2001 (Manigart et al., 2006; Wright & 
Lockett, 2003). 
 
Syndication by venture capital firms is based on a desire to share and to reduce risks 
(Lockett & Wright, 2001; De Clercq & Dimov, 2004).   Sharing of risks involves including 
other investors through syndication at various stages of the investment (Lockett & Wright, 
2001).  Risks are reduced through sharing information, and including investors who increase 
the likelihood of success of the venture (Lockett & Wright, 2001; De Clercq & Dimov, 2004).  
The end goal of any syndication, apart from reducing and sharing risks, is to raise the mean 
expected return on the investment (Lockett & Wright, 2001).  Syndicating has been shown 
to achieve this result, as these syndicated investments tend to produce higher IRRs for the 
venture capital investor (Cumming & Walz, 2004).  Complementing the improved return 
profile of syndicated venture capital investments is the notion that often the lead investors 
in those transactions will have a lower required return on capital in the early-stages of the 
venture than would otherwise be the case if making the investment alone.  This tendency 
has been attributed to the ability of a syndicate to provide superior access to information 
and better control of the venture (Manigart et al., 2002). 
 
Venture capitalists syndicate their investments either to manage the portfolio of 
investments at the fund level, or the individual investments themselves (Manigart et al., 
2006).  When used as a tool to manage a portfolio, syndication is undertaken to reduce 
unsystematic risk through diversification (Bygrave, 1987; De Clercq & Dimov, 2004), provide 
window dressing7 for the investment fund (Lerner, 1994), improve reciprocal deal flow 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), and/or share the due diligence burden and costs across a 
portfolio (Lockett & Wright, 2001). 
 
On the investment side, where more than one investor is involved, the selection of 
investments is often ameliorated due to improved screening, due diligence and decision 
making (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002; Lerner, 1994).  Investee firms will often receive a 
                                                          
7
 Lerner describes an example of window dressing in the pension fund industry as managers adjusting their 
portfolios at the end of quarter by buying firms whose shares have appreciated and selling “mistakes”.   This 
practice allows the portfolio of companies to have an appearance of better performance than has actually 
been achieved. 
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higher level of expertise and experience as compared to those firms with only one investor 
(Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Sapienza, 1992).  Syndicating can also mitigate governance 
problems (Lerner, 1994), and provide improved exit potential due to the markets perceived 
value of reputable investment firms first making the decision to invest through positive 
signalling (Stuart et al., 1999; Hursti & Maula, 2007). 
 
This researcher could only find one piece of research on syndication in a South African 
context.  Bent et al. (2004) published in the South African Journal of Business Management 
a piece titled, The syndication of private equity investments in South Africa.  The research 
represented a survey of South Africa Private Equity8 firms to determine whether they were 
motivated to syndicate by sharing financial risk (finance-based rational), accessing specific 
resources of other firms (resource-based rationale), and/or increasing deal flow (deal flow 
rationale).  The survey largely followed the example of Lockett and Wright (2001) in the UK 
and Manigart et al. (2002) for Europe.  Of the 42 firms in the sample, 70% (or 30) 
responded, and 60% of the responding firms had previously syndicated.   
 
The core finding was that the most important reason for syndicating a private equity 
investment in South Africa in the early-2000s was the large size of the investment in 
proportion to the available funds.   The two least important reasons were that the 
investment was in a sector in which the firm does not usually invest, and that the 
opportunity was outside their usual investment stage.   The top two rationales were 
therefore finance-based.  Within the resource-based rationale, the most important reason 
given from the industry professionals at that time was the need to access specific skills.  
Future reciprocal deal flow was cited as important, but ranked as the third most important 
in this survey.  Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)9, though not included in the 
questionnaire directly, was mentioned as a rationale for syndicating in South Africa. 
 
                                                          
8
 Note that this study focused on private equity, and not specifically venture capital as in the study at hand.  
The average size of the syndicated investments in the research were ZAR 237.9mn.  
9
 In South Africa, the BEE legislation aims at increasing participation in the formal economy by inducing 
companies to have more shareholders and employees of what is termed previously disadvantaged 
backgrounds (i.e., those largely excluded from protection and benefits under the Apartheid regime).  BEE has 
now been replaced by Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) which has the same objectives as 
BEE.  BEE and BBBEE are South Africa’s leading approaches to indigenisation. 
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The preponderance of the research indicates that venture capitalists much prefer to invest 
close to their proximity (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Lerner, 1995; 
Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993).  In spite of that tendency, for a number of reasons US and 
European venture investors began to intensify their investments into foreign markets in the 
late-1990s (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008; Alhorr et al., 2008; Meuleman & Wright, 2011).  A 
stream of research has emerged which looks at syndication of venture capital investments 
through an international lens, and that research is described below. 
 
3.3 Drivers of cross-border investments and syndication 
It is often very challenging for ventures to attract foreign venture capital (Makela & Maula, 
2008).    In many markets, having the ability to attract foreign capital from more developed 
and deeper capital markets (e.g., US and Europe) can make the difference in whether 
funding ever occurs due to the anaemic nature of many domestic capital markets (Wright et 
al., 2005).    
 
There are at least 2 reasons why venture capitalists invest abroad.  First, by crossing borders 
they can exploit differences in risk-adjusted returns between the home and portfolio 
countries (Schertler & Tykvova, 2012).  Returns vary across markets for a variety of reasons 
including less competition, higher growth prospects, and other macro and micro differences 
between the domestic and foreign investment ecosystems.  One of the pitfalls of investing 
across borders is higher transaction costs, which tend to be markedly higher than for 
domestic investments (Wright et al., 2005; Cumming & Johan, 2007).  Obviously, the 
variance in return must be greater than transactions costs for the investment to be justified.   
 
Second, they co-invest abroad for the other aforementioned reasons inherent to investment 
syndication in general.  These include reducing systemic risk through diversification, 
monitoring costs, due diligence and initial screening costs.  These also include improving 
chances of an IPO exit, deal flow, and expertise for the investee company by bringing 
investors to the investment with valuable skills and networks.  
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Venture capital flows are greater where a suitable domestic co-investment partner is 
present.   This is the case not only due to the local investor’s contacts and knowledge of the 
market, but also because they take care of certain responsibilities that are easier (and more 
cost efficient) to manage from a close proximity such as monitoring and day-to-day 
management of the investment (Makela & Maula, 2008).  It should be noted that the 
positive effects of a domestic co-investor are diminished where the venture has a strong 
entrepreneurial team, and this occurs because less monitoring and management support is 
required by the investors in those ventures (Makela & Maula, 2008; Sapienza, 1992).   This 
phenomenon extends to situations where the home market, and thus the local investor’s 
knowledge and local networks, is not as important in terms of sales or as a launching pad of 
international operations (Makela & Maula, 2008).   
 
Also driving cross-border syndication are contractual and regulatory uniqueness of a country 
and degrees of legal protections offered by a country.  Research on the impact of regulatory 
and contractual uniqueness indicates that these differences have a material effect on a 
transaction and decision to form a cross-border syndication (Black & Gilson, 1998; Bruton et 
al., 2005; Jeng & Wells, 2000).  This effect is especially prevalent where one investor 
operates in a common law system (e.g., UK and USA), and the other under a civil law code 
(Cumming & Flemming, 2004).10  Countries often differ as to the degrees and manners of 
legal protections offered to investors (La Porta et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1998).  Local 
investors grasp these nuances, and will often have developed informal mechanisms to deal 
with gaps in the protections offered by the State and other local institutions (Meuleman & 
Wright, 2008). 
 
3.4 Benefits of cross-border investing through syndication 
The body of research on the benefits of international syndication indicates that they can 
offer the following benefits:  reduced costs, superior performance, better decision making, 
higher levels of ongoing commitment, and transfer of high social status from and to the 
investors and ventures.   
                                                          
10
 South Africa, through founded as a Roman-Dutch legal system, has largely adopted the English Common Law 
system of jurisprudence. 
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3.4.1 Reduce Costs: 
Having an investor in close spatial proximity to a venture can be especially important in the 
early years of a venture when more assistance and monitoring are required (Fritsch & 
Schilder, 2008).  The further the distance11, the more difficult and expensive these 
monitoring and support functions become (Dai et al., 2012).  Often, when firms make cross-
border venture investments they devote less energy and resources to the venture due in 
part to higher transaction costs (Sapienze et al., 1996; Frisch & Schilder, 2008).  The higher 
transaction and ongoing costs become even more difficult to justify in instances where the 
venture is not as successful as expected, and perhaps more important than withholding 
future funding, the research shows that time commitments to these far away ventures can 
wane more than those nearby (Makela & Maula, 2006).  By reducing costs and having at 
least one investor near the venture, many of these disadvantages of distance are mitigated.   
 
A foreign investor can also reduce costs by assisting in internationalizing the venture and 
thus make trading in foreign markets less costly in at least a few ways.  First, the presence of 
a foreign investor generally makes learning about and expanding into that market less costly 
(Makela & Maula, 2005).  Second, the foreign investor can more easily connect the venture 
to networks and relevant foreign suppliers, customers and financiers in the foreign 
investor’s country (Makela & Maula, 2005).  That connection to foreign markets has been 
shown to increase the likelihood of a portfolio company expanding where an international 
investor is present (Yli-Renko et al., 2002; McDougall et al., 1994; Makela & Maula, 2005).   
Third, a foreign investor can provide benefits in the form of an endorsement (Stuart et al., 
1999; Makela & Maula, 2005) in the local market where the foreign investor has a high-
status.    
 
3.4.2 Better performance: 
Under the right conditions, venture capital investments which contain both domestic and 
international investors perform better (Chemmanur et al., 2010).  In a study on 
internationally syndicated venture capital investments in Canada, Brander et al. (2002) 
                                                          
11
 In this context, distance also refers to cultural, language, legal and other differences besides just geographic 
distance. 
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found that these investments outperform those with only one country represented in the 
venture syndicate.   
 
Hochberg et al. (2007) suggests that the increase in performance can be at least partially 
explained by the strong established networks of firms who tend to syndicate. That research 
found that better-networked venture capitalists are more likely to syndicate and to be 
attractive co-investment partners.  The strong networks, they argued, led to more access by 
the portfolio companies to future funding, customers, strategic alliances and service 
providers (e.g., headhunters and investment bankers).  To derive these conclusions the 
researchers looked at the rates and patterns of syndication of 3,469 US venture capital 
funds that participated in 47,705 investment rounds involving 16,315 portfolio companies12.   
 
Other research suggests that knowledge sharing is another contributor to success.  De 
Clercq & Dimov (2008) found that improved performance is more pronounced where one of 
the investors has a specific knowledge which closes an exposed gap in the other investor’s 
knowledge and/or expertise.  They looked at 200 US venture capital firms, through a 
longitudinal study, and determined that investing in industries in which a firm has more 
knowledge and investing with a more familiar external partner enhances investment 
performance. 
 
Seppa (2003) found a link between investor prominence (international or local) and 
valuations of venture backed companies.  Due to the sophistication of a high-status co-
investor, valuations are often lower at the front end, which was attributed to the higher 
bargaining power that high-status investors possess.  In later rounds, the converse is true 
vis-à-vis valuations.  Valuations in later rounds increase due to that same bargaining power, 
experience, and the ability to add value to the enterprise prior to seeking future funding or 
an exit.  These phenomena are value enhancing and increase investment performance. 
 
                                                          
12
 The data came from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics database. 
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3.4.3 Better Decisions (less risk) Due to Sharing Knowledge: 
Domestic investors will generally have a more fine-grained understanding of the local legal 
institutions, where to find certain resources, and offer more nuanced and potent business 
and expansion advice (Devigne et al., 2011).  They also may have valuable knowledge about 
the operation of the local market, including deal flow, along with a profound network of 
contacts and familiarity with the different local requirements (Meuleman & Wright, 2008).  
To effectively augment and adjust its knowledge about a foreign market, a foreign venture 
capitalist will often co-invest with domestic investors to gain knowledge about the local 
institutional environment (Bruton et al., 2005).   Due to the smaller budgets and fund sizes 
of venture capital investors (relative to private equity funds and larger multinational 
corporations), and necessity to invest in and manage more companies, co-investing is often 
the preferred knowledge generating mechanism for early-stage investment firms (Buckley et 
al., 1992; Meuleman & Wright, 2008). 
 
International investors from the developed venture capital markets often have a specialized 
and potent set of knowledge points and networks which can be extremely valuable to the 
right venture.  This phenomenon is explained by a tendency of developed world investors to 
specialise in certain niches in order to remain competitive (Busenitz et al., 2004; Hellman & 
Puri, 2002).  There is value in combining local knowledge with the specialized knowledge 
and networks of international investors, where those niche areas of expertise are relevant 
to the venture.  Supporting this research are the well-established assumptions in the field of 
international business which indicate that knowledge gleaned from operating in a home 
country is often not directly relevant or useful when expanding abroad (Dunning, 1993; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Vernon, 1979).   That knowledge must be 
purchased, learned organically through trial-and-error, or ascertained though including 
suitable local investors in the consortium. 
 
Knowledge sharing between international investors and the portfolio company can also 
impact the internationalization of the venture.  Where a foreign investor is participating in 
the investment and openly shares information pertaining to internationalization and 
international markets, internationalization of the venture occurs which carries various 
useful and diverse benefits (Fernhaber et al., 2009; Lutz & George, 2010).  
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Internationalization is often driven towards the home market of the international investor 
with sometimes detrimental effects (Makela & Maula, 2005). 
 
3.4.4 Higher Exit Potential 
The ability to successfully exit an investment is a key component of the Venture Capital 
Cycle (Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  Jones (2009) does a nice job of describing why this is the 
case by outlining prior literature which show the importance of viable exit availability to 
fostering private investment.  That prior literature consumes the remainder of this 
paragraph and begins with Jeng & Wells (2000) who in a study of 21 countries found that 
the availability of IPO exits is a significant determinant of later stage funding.  Da Rin et al. 
(2006) looked at 14 European countries and found that opening a stock market targeting 
entrepreneurial ventures has a positive net effect on that domestic venture capital 
ecosystem.  Farag et al. (2004) suggests that lack of viable exits other than trade sales has a 
negative impact on venture capital in a country, and based their findings on a study of 
Central and Eastern European transactions.  Lastly, Banerjee (2008) showed that a key 
factor in venture capital development in India was a surging stock market with attractive 
valuations for investors. 
 
Other research in this space of venture exits and their relation to the international nature of 
a syndicate offers interesting findings.  First, when a foreign investor is involved in a 
transaction the likelihood of a successful IPO exit increases (Hursti & Maula, 2007; 
Jaaskelainnen & Maula, 2005).   Second, the probability of a successful exit when investing 
abroad increases significantly when distant venture capital firms syndicate with venture 
capital firms located nearby to the venture (Cumming & Dai, 2010; Moser, 2010).    Lastly, 
companies with venture investors tend to experience lower costs when it is time to go 
public for a multitude of reasons including prior experience of the venture capitalists, and 
the fact that venture funded companies often have tighter books, stronger networks and 
fewer ‘skeletons’ (Megginson & Weiss, 1991).     
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3.4.5 Higher levels of on-going commitment to venture 
An issue when investing abroad is commitment to ventures which don’t live up to 
expectations immediately.  Local co-investment partners tend to induce higher levels of on-
going support and commitment to the investment by the foreign co-investor (Makela & 
Maula, 2006).  This effect diminishes in foreign venture capital investors with less distance 
to the country of the investment, possessing other investments in the market, having more 
long-term reciprocal relationships with co-investors in the country of the investment, and 
where higher financial stakes (i.e., larger deals) are present (Makela & Maula, 2006).   The 
research by Makela & Maula applying commitment theory to internationally syndicated 
venture capital transactions is described more fully in chapter 6.2.6.3 of this research. 
 
3.4.6 Positive social status of having a foreign investor 
Positive social status of a reputable foreign investor transfers particularly well to a domestic 
investor and venture (Guler & Guillen, 2009).  It’s been shown that high-status investors 
provide a strong signal to the market which attracts other investors, increases the venture’s 
chances of success, and entrepreneurs will often accept a discount in valuation to receive 
these (and other) benefits of a high-status investor (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Lerner, 1994; 
Stuart et al., 1999; Piskorski, 2004; Hockberg et al., 2007; Hsu, 2004; De Clercq & Dimov, 
2004).  This effect seems to also go the other way in that participation of high-status 
venture capital firms in the country of the venture may play a positive role in legitimizing 
the venture in the eyes of the foreign investor (Hursti & Maula, 2007; Makela & Maula, 
2005; Stuart et al., 1999). 
 
3.5 Risks/Constraints of cross-border investment and 
syndication 
 
There is scant mention of risks and constraints of cross-border investing and syndicating in 
the existing body of literature.13  However, there is literature which touches indirectly or in 
passing on international syndication, both domestically and across borders.  There is also 
                                                          
13
 This is probably a logical development, given the relative youth and shallowness of the prior research in the 
field.  More research is needed in this area. 
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relevant literature in various areas of international business which look at risks and 
downsides to be mitigated with international partnerships.  Some of those are described 
below.   
 
The benefits of interfirm cooperation and co-investing with domestic and international 
investors can be offset by the contractual risks associated with forming such partnerships 
(Caves, 1996).  These risks can include, but are not limited to, increased transaction costs 
associated with more negotiations and necessity to accommodate all parties, a higher 
likelihood of disagreements occurring throughout the transaction, and difficulty in 
concluding the transaction due to more deal complexity.    
 
Amit et al. (1998) is one piece of literature this researcher found with direct insights into risk 
and constraints in a venture capital context.  The researchers describe how transaction costs 
are amplified in venture capital or other early-stage investments due to those investments 
being more opaque and uncertain, with information asymmetries between the 
entrepreneur and investor more pronounced.   The heightened level of due diligence of 
these investments requires substantial pre-investment screening, on-going monitoring after 
the investment is made and continuous control of the venture and relationships through 
various mechanisms.   
 
Meuleman & Wright (2008) suggest that making cross-border venture capital investments 
further add to these costs.  Physical distance is a factor in their analysis, but so too are other 
distances such as cultural, language, rule of law and business custom differences.  As firms 
learn about the foreign market, the incentive to co-invest could diminish due to the desire 
to avoid and remove such interfirm risks.   
 
The body of literature on the liabilities of foreignness is also edifying, and describes the risks 
and costs associated with operating in a foreign market.  When firms and investors expand 
internationally, those costs that result from unfamiliarity with the new market, and from 
political, cultural and economic difference between the foreign and domestic markets cause 
this phenomenon of liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995; Dia et al., 2010).  These effects 
are amplified where the venture is early in its development and without the resources or 
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skills to cope in the new environment (Clarysse et al., 2007; Zahara et al., 2007).  Although 
one of the aforementioned benefits of having a local investor in the syndicate is knowledge 
sharing, the risk remains and is hardly ever perfectly mitigated, even with an ideal local 
investor in the syndicate.   
 
In a 2009 study by Du on the heterogeneity of syndicate partners in venture capital 
investments, it was found that heterogeneous syndicates may incur higher transactions 
costs ex post.  Communication and coordination costs can be higher, leading to more 
conflicts, slower decision making and delayed execution.  Different knowledge of one 
market can increase the information asymmetry among venture capitalists, leading to less 
effort from the experienced investors.  Lastly, the study found that due to these higher 
transaction costs, venture capitalists prefer homogeneous syndicates, and that the 
heterogeneous syndicates may underperform those funded by homogeneous venture 
investors.  It should be noted the above study by Du defined heterogeneity of venture 
investors largely by levels of experience and prior performance.14  The study also dealt 
solely with domestic syndication.   
 
Many of the key constraints of the types of relationships as studied in the research at hand 
revolve around agency issues.  Agency issues are those concerning the difficulty in 
motivating one party (the agent) to act in the best interest of another (the principal) rather 
than his own interest.  In an international syndicate backed venture capital relationship, 
there are agency issues both between the entrepreneurs and the investors, and between 
the investors.  Those which exist between the entrepreneurs and investors are fairly 
obvious, and one of the advantages of having a local partner in the consortium is the ability 
to mitigate those agency issues through efficient monitoring and interacting with the 
management team.  The agency issues between the investors, however is more difficult to 
address and understand.  Many of the larger transaction costs associated with international 
transactions are attributable either directly or indirectly to the agency issues among 
investors.   
                                                          
14
 Du also controlled for venture capital connectedness, geographic distance among venture capitalists, 
geographic distance between portfolio companies and prior syndication among venture capitalists and the 
results held. 
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One agency issue in particular which has been studied in a cross-border syndication context 
deals with cream skimming,15 or the propensity of local investors to invest in the best 
ventures and to then include international investors in the deals which remain.   The 
incentive to behave in this fashion is perfectly natural, and based on a desire to not dilute 
future returns (Guler & McGahan, 2006).  Apart from withholding the best deals from the 
international investor, there are other inherent agency problems which slow international 
syndication such as when an informed investor does not disclose all known and material 
information (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Filatotchev, Wright & Arberk, 2006).   
 
3.6 Role of the Local Partner 
There is one piece of known literature which specifically addresses the role of the local 
partner in an international syndicated venture capital backed venture transaction.  That 
piece is by Makela and Maula (2008) and titled, Attracting Cross-Border Venture Capital:  
The Role of Local Investment Partners in International Syndicate Arrangements.  Owing to 
the lack of prior research and available data in the field, they chose an inductive approach 
building on case study analysis from which to draw the following conclusions.   
 
They determined four attributes which mattered in these transactions and relationships.  
Those are the existence of a high quality local investor, participation in the management of 
the local investor in the venture’s management, local investor’s knowledge and social 
capital in the local market, and degree of international social capital with other foreign 
investors possessed by the local investor.   
 
First, the existence of a high quality local investor matters as they are often first to invest, 
with foreign investors joining in later rounds.  The status of the local investor signals to the 
international community that the venture has been vetted, and is viable.  These findings 
were supported by prior research (Stuart et al., 1999). 
 
Second, participation of the local investor in the venture is key as it can more effectively 
manage cultural, language, regulatory and other operational decisions than an investor 
                                                          
15
 Cream Skimming is addressed later in this research in Chapter 6.2.6.1. 
34 | P a g e  
 
operating from a different country.  Interestingly, the researchers found the better the 
entrepreneurial experiences of the management team, the less profound the benefits of 
having a local investor.  Intuitively, this makes sense as well run ventures require less 
monitoring, a finding that is also supported by prior research (Sapienze, 1992; Kuemmerle, 
2002). 
 
Third, the local investor’s knowledge and local social capital are valuable as these networks 
and knowledge are readily transferable to the venture, making a successful outcome for the 
venture more likely.  As with providing monitoring functions, where the management team 
has existing local social capital, the value of the local investor diminishes, and that 
statement is supported by the same research (Sapienze, 1992; Kuemmerle, 2002). 
 
Lastly, strong international networks of the local investor increases the likelihood of an 
international syndicate forming.  Even were ventures are not cross-border investment ready, 
the investors in the sample with strong international networks were often able to source 
qualified foreign investors.  Investment readiness, and receiving investment, they found 
were not always perfectly correlated.  The findings are supported by international literature 
on the effects of international social capital on resource acquisition (Arenius & Autio, 2002; 
Autio, 2005). 
 
Jaaskelainen et al. (2006) also supports the proposition that the local investor is best 
positioned to serve as the lead investor.  The management of a syndicated investment, they 
suggest, is typically the responsibility of the lead investor who manages both the venture 
and the syndicate, and often sits on the board and is more hands on with the monitoring.  A 
non-lead investor will usually spend 1/10th of the time on management of a syndicated 
venture as compared to the lead investor (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). 
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4 Methodology and Sample 
4.1 Research Approach and Strategy 
A review of the literature, as has been demonstrated, shows that there are several benefits 
of international syndication to both the venture and the investors.  It’s likely that 
internationally syndicated venture transactions, if properly structured, would benefit South 
African ventures and investors.  The purpose of this research is to assess why these 
transactions aren’t more common, and to identify whether the local venture capital 
investors are ready and willing to syndicate internationally, and the constraints in South 
Africa which may be hindering these transactions.   
 
Recognizing that the body of international literature is in its relative infancy, interviews16 
were chosen as the means of gathering data.  This is appropriate for at least two reasons.  
First, interviews allow for a more open and broad manner of gaining understanding.  Since 
little is known about the international syndicating patterns in South Africa (and for that 
matter internationally), giving the interviewees freedom to roam and proffer insights was 
preferred to the more limiting and direct responses which often result from questionnaires.   
Second, given the current nascent nature of the venture capital ecosystem in South Africa, 
there aren’t many active and/or credible investors from which to gather insights.  Interviews 
allow for a more exhaustive exploration of the subject, and in a way more likely to uncover 
novel and important dynamics of these transactions in South Africa.  With an understanding 
of the pros and cons of each, the more difficult and time consuming interview methodology 
was selected for this research.  
 
This research, then, is of a qualitative nature given that the investigation revolves around 
insights and opinions rather than specific data.  Understanding the nature, limitations and 
strengths of this type of research is important.  Peshkin (1993) cited in Leedy & Omrod 
(2005) describes the benefits or purposes of qualitative research as being: 
 
                                                          
16
 More on the interview instrument and structure are include in subsection 4.3 of this chapter. 
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 Description – revealing and describing how things are in particular situations, 
settings and contexts, 
 Interpretation – enabling the research to gain new insights into particular 
phenomenon and/or discover the problems that exist within a particular 
phenomenon, 
 Verification – the researcher is able to test existing theories and assumptions within 
a real-world context, and 
 Evaluation – the researcher can investigate the effectiveness or otherwise of 
particular practices and policies in respect of the particular context. 
 
As described by Bryman & Bell (2007) cited in Morgan (2009), the key limitations of 
qualitative research are:  
 
 The problem of subjectivity with respect to the researcher’s interpretation and 
selection of data.  This is partially mitigated by this researcher having a firm 
understanding of the existing body of research on the topic prior to the interviews, 
and the fact that the questions are largely open-ended.   Interpretations and analysis 
will be based on that prior research. 
 Qualitative research is difficult to replicate in that the research design and 
implementation coupled with the involvement of the researcher means that the 
precise methodology is unlikely to be exactly replicated.  This limitation is partially 
mitigated by the fact that each interview is conducted with the same interview 
structure.  Additionally, the nature of the data sought in this case is not the type 
which necessary needs to be replicatable to be viable and relevant. 
 Problems of generalization – can findings be generalized to other settings?  This 
limitation is partially mitigated by the narrow scope of this study, which does not 
include generalizing conclusions to other markets and industries.    
 Transparency is often a concern in qualitative research in that it is often difficult to 
fully understand what the researcher did in arriving at his or her conclusions.  It is 
hoped that this limitation is mitigated by offering a detailed description of the way in 
which the interviews were prepared, administered and data gleaned analysed. 
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4.2 Sampling 
The sample group was defined by firstly looking at the South African Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Association (SAVCA) members list as reported in its 2013 industry review.  
The full membership list for SAVCA contained contact details for 121 Firms.  After excluding 
firms which weren’t actively engaged in private equity investments, under which venture 
capital is a sub-asset class, the number dropped to 85.  Firms would self-report as not being 
actively engaged in investing for a number of reasons including (but not limited to) lack of 
funds, already having a full portfolio of investments, or a strategic decision to abstain from 
investing in South Africa for a period.  Whatever the reason, they were excluded. 
 
As this research is focused on venture capital investments, eliminated further were those 
firms which self-reported an unwillingness to participate in early-stage investments, 
reducing the sample size to 30.   Next, eliminated by category were those firms which 
operate fully or in substantial fashion within the government sector.  Government investors 
were eliminated to make cross-comparison more effective due to the fact that the 
international body of literature which has interviewed or surveyed through questionnaires 
practitioners do not contain a significant number of government actors.17  Further 
eliminated were those SAVCA members that indicated a current position of not making 
investments in South Africa, leaving 21 firms. 
 
The population of 21 firms was then reduced to 7 when firms which were either known to 
be no longer investing and/or winding down operations, not having a physical presence in 
South Africa18, or firms with mandates to make primarily socially ameliorative or impact 
investments.  Those decisions were made based on a review of newspaper and magazine 
articles, discussions with individuals who operate in the space and the respective company 
websites.  This final population from which the sample was drawn represented 5.78% of the 
database of 121 firms.  The number of investment executives at the 7 firms, according to 
the SAVCA database, is 23. 
                                                          
17
 Most of that research comes from Finland, the US, Germany and Israel.  These countries have vibrant 
international investment climates and track records with almost entirely private sector participants. 
18
 Conceivably foreign firms become members to have a connection to South Africa which could have several 
benefits such as deal flow and improved access to service providers. 
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As a reasonability check it’s edifying to look at Van Deventer (2009) who administered 
surveys to South African venture capitalists and also used the SAVCA database as a starting 
point.  In that sample, 16 firms were identified as venture capital firms to be surveyed. 
Assuming the sample of 16 is reduced in a corresponding fashion to the decrease in venture 
capital transactions from 2008 to 201219, that new phantom sample would be 8 firms which 
corresponds closely to this sample of 7. 
 
There are at least 2 limitations to this sample.  First, not all entities which make venture 
capital investments into South Africa companies are SAVCA members.  Many are angel 
investors, or firms which for their own reasons choose to not join SAVCA.  Due in large part 
to SAVCA’s strong reputation and position as the leading industry representative, there are 
a very small number of firms with capital to invest which aren’t SAVCA members.  As such, 
the loss of those firms is not believed to have a material impact on this research.   Second, 
the data is self-reported so funds could inflate/deflate numbers to gain a perceived 
advantage, or downplay a weakness, in the eyes of other SAVCA members or public.   This 
second limitation is mitigated by the fact that SAVCA sends descriptive surveys each year to 
its members, leaving little ambiguity, and the small scale of the South African venture 
capital industry decreases information asymmetry, and makes embellishing results more 
likely to backfire. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Methods and Research Instrument 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
The primary source of original data in this research was derived from interviews conducted 
with 7 venture capitalists and early-stage investors in South Africa.  The interview questions 
were primarily open-ended, however a limited number of questions were close-ended.   The 
interviews were conducted either in the interviewee firm’s boardroom (4), or telephonically 
(2), and in one case in a nearby restaurant near to a conference venue where the 
                                                          
19
 According to the SAVCA Venture Solutions survey in 2012 the number of transactions from 2008 to 2012 was 
nearly halved. 
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interviewee was speaking.  A copy of the interview structure and notes used by this 
researcher in each interview is included in the appendix. 
All participants were initially sent an email describing briefly the research, with an invitation 
to participate.  Of the 7 responses sent (7 corresponds to the number of firms in the sample) 
7 individuals agreed to an interview, from 5 firms.  The remaining 2 firms never responded 
after repeated follow-up emails and phone calls.   One firm offered 3 interviews from 
various professionals at that firm.    Thus, the response rate to interview requests was 71.4% 
at the firm level.  At the 5 firms interviewed, there are 17 investment professionals 
employed, according to the SAVCA database.  The 17 professionals represent 73.9% of the 
total sample of 23 professionals.  This response rate is commensurate with Van Deventer 
(2009) who had a response rate of 75% after 12 of 16 South African venture capital firms 
respond to a request to complete an online survey.  
 
Each interview was handled similarly, and the length of each interview ranged from 45 
minutes to 1 hour and 15 minutes.  Recording the interviews was decided against to 
encourage a free flow of information and to increase the number of the population agreeing 
to be interviewed.  Each interviewee was told that the firm and individual’s names would 
not be mentioned in the report, and that all information and data would be presented in 
aggregate, and in a way to make pinpointing the respondent and his/her responses very 
difficult and unlikely.  This researcher felt these steps to be necessary given the very 
secretive nature of the industry in general, and more especially in South Africa.  As evidence 
of the extreme care to which many South African venture investors take to conceal their 
deal and transaction information, one should notice the number of deals and investments 
which are never disclosed to the public, and when they are the amount of the investment 
and the general terms of the deal are more often than not excluded from the discussion.  
Contrast this with the situation in the US and Europe, for example, where that type of deal 
insight is almost considered public information and expected to be divulged. 
 
The data collected were responses, handwritten by the interviewer, under the specific 
question being asked at that point on the interview notes taken to each interview.  In 
instances where an interviewee would offer insights into an already discussed question, the 
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interviewer would log those notes under the preceding question’s note space.  Later, these 
responses were categorized (chapter 5) and analysed (chapter 6). 
 
4.3.2 Research Instruments – Interview Question Preparation 
To determine if South African venture investors are ready and willing to syndicate 
internationally, a three pronged approach was incorporated into the structure of the 
interviews.  First, each interviewee was asked directly whether or not their firm had 
internationally syndicated, and if they had approached or been approached for the same.  
The rationale for this set of threshold questions was to determine if the option to syndicate 
internationally had come up in prior dealings, and also whether it was a strategy which had 
been contemplated.   Other relevant demographic information of the interviewees were 
also collected at this stage. 
 
Second, the perceptions of benefits of internationally syndicating venture capital 
investments to both the South African investor and the international investor were 
determined.  By ascertaining the perceptions of benefits in the minds of South African 
venture investors to both the local and international investor through interviews, it would 
then be possible to compare those results to these prior findings and academic gleanings.  
The importance of that comparison is at least two fold.  First, if the South African venture 
investors perceive no or limited benefits to syndicating internationally, then that is evidence 
of at least part of the cause of the condition this research seeks to understand.  Second, 
assuming the respondents do perceive benefits the benefits they highlight, omit and include 
in their responses also offer valuable insights both in their own right, and when compared 
to those described in the international body of literature.  Motivations for syndication were 
also ascertained to further elucidate the local investors’ attitudes towards co-investing with 
international investors into South African ventures. 
 
The third category of questions related to constraints to syndicating internationally.  As 
mentioned, this area is not often researched so these responses have the potential to 
significantly shape the international understanding of the field of international syndication 
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of venture investments.  Perhaps more importantly, the responses would be the first20 
fodder for academic analysis of what the constraints to these transactions may be in South 
Africa.   
 
In terms of the verbiage and structure of the actual questions, they were generally 
construed and left open-ended by design.  Not only would open-ended questions tease out 
those responses at the forefront of the interviewees’ understanding, they would also allow 
for a more relevant and targeted series of follow-on questions to learn more.  The 
propensity of the questions to lead the interviewee to certain responses was also reduced 
through this strategy.  
 
As a final point, the interview questions and structure were reviewed by this researcher’s 
supervisor, and cleared by the Commerce Faculty Ethics Committee at the University of 
Cape Town.  All feedback from these and other sources were contemplated and 
incorporated into the final interview structure and process. 
5 Results 
The handwritten notes from each interview were condensed to one comprehensive 
document showing the questions asked, and the notes taken.  Repeated responses were 
lumped together and were thus only written once.  Certain responses were flagged as more 
important than others.  The decision to flag a response was based on a factor analysis of the 
following elements: repeated mentioning throughout the interviews, a perception by the 
interviewer gleaned from tone and other non-verbal cues that the response was more 
important, and more time taken during the interviews to address certain topics and ideas.  
In the listings below, those flagged responses are underlined. 
 
Interpreting some responses as more important than others has the positive impact of 
further shaping the data and analysis to show which benefits, constraints and motivations 
                                                          
20
 There is research on deficiencies of the South African ecosystem, which have been previously described.  
While that research was instructive in the discussion of the results, it sought to understand the venture capital 
industry in South Africa in general, while this research looks more narrowly at the topic of international 
syndication in a South African context. 
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were at the forefront on the interviewees minds.  However, this researcher is well aware 
that a response being mentioned more often, for example, does not itself prove a causation 
or higher correlation to what is being measured than do the other responses.  Further, more 
time devoted to discussing a topic may only prove that the particular topic lends itself better 
to explanation relative to other topics, which may or may not have more relevance to this 
research. 
 
5.1  Demographics 
In the course of and leading up to the interviews, demographic data was collected from and 
on the interviewees.  This data is presented below in order to further understand the 
participating sample, and place the findings and analysis in subsequent chapters in context. 
 
The respondents came from 5 firms.  Collectively, they have invested and have cash reserves 
worth approximately USD 83mn.  This figure is an estimate and based on information from 
industry professionals in South Africa, news articles and SAVCA data.  As has been previously 
discussed, fund values are often left undisclosed in South Africa, along with details 
surrounding investments and investment sizes.  Managing those investments and assets for 
the five respective firms are approximately 17 investment professionals. The combined 
number of early-stage investments of the 5 interviewed firms is 26.  The investments range 
from very small seed investments, to relatively large series A21 and follow-on rounds of 
more that USD 3mn.  Here is a table showing these data points visually (rand/dollar 
exchange rate of 10/1 assumed): 
 
Table 5:  Financial character of research sample 
  USD ZAR 
Collective AUM 83mn 830mn 
# of firms 5 
# of investment professionals 17 
Collective Investments 26 
Avg. assets per professional 4.8mn 48mn 
                                                          
21
 Series A investment is a company’s first significant funding round and does not include seed or other 
previous smaller fundraising rounds.   
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All of the respondents have been approached by foreign investors and/or firms to be co-
investment partners in a South African venture.  All but one has returned the favour by 
inviting an international investor to serve as a co-investor in a South African venture.  The 
respondents all expressed a desire to syndicate with international investors, however none 
had a strategy to do so, nor a track record of successfully partnering with foreign investors. 
 
All but one of the firms interviewed are independent financial firms, with one being a 
captive to a larger institution.  The average age of the firms in the sample is 4.4 years.  All of 
the firms were funded by private shareholders, with one firm also having Developmental 
Finance Institutions (DFI)22 shareholders. 
 
5.2 Benefits 
The listings below present the responses received during the interviews.  In the discussion 
section in Chapter 6, these responses are each placed into categories, and those categories 
of responses analysed. 
 
Question 1 - What are in your opinion the benefits to you of having an international co-
investor in a South African based venture? 
 Gaining access to new markets.  If the foreign investor is in one of the possible 
expansion markets, that local market knowledge of the foreign investor can assist the 
South African venture expand more quickly. 
 Access to capital will be improved which is important in South Africa due to the seeming 
lack of available risk capital. 
 The ability to attract purchasers (and IPOs) later in the investment cycle will likely be 
improved, especially where the international investor is in a country with a deep capital 
market. 
 By having a high-status international investor the venture is validated and serves as a 
sort of stamp of approval.  This stamp of approval carries with it many benefits.  
                                                          
22
 Examples include the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC), Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), among others. 
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 South African venture capitalists are largely generalists without specialities.  Foreign 
investors tend to specialize so bringing in the appropriate foreign investor could mean 
having an investor with years of experience in that narrow band/field which the South 
African venture operates. 
 The foreign capital markets are deeper and having an investor from one of those 
markets in the consortium should lead to the ability to do bigger deals and makes 
follow-on investments easier/possible.  In other words, access to capital is improved. 
 Track record of doing deals from foreign investors.  The local industry is relatively young 
and inexperienced.  Possessing a foreign investor with a greater track record of 
concluding investments brings a lot of knowledge to the table in terms of best practices 
and new developments in the industry.   
 The foreign investor, attributable largely to a deeper set of past experiences, should be 
able to more quickly and effectively assist in the due diligence required to size up the 
investment.  This could equate to a lower total transaction cost and improved upfront 
screening. 
 South African venture capitalists tend to scrape up money and fund with not as much 
thought to future funding rounds as international investors.  Not only do international 
investors have access to more capital, they have a mind-set which contemplates a 
strategy towards future funding rounds. 
 
Question 2 - What are in your opinion the benefits for the international firm of having a 
local co-investor (like you) when investing into a South African based venture? 
 The investment is de-risked in many ways as the local investor has local knowledge, and 
can remotely manage the deal.  These benefits include localised due diligence processes, 
validation (if SA firm is high-status), knowledge of local nuances/regulatory hurdles, local 
networks and support services which are valuable pre- and post-investment. 
 Cost reduction is a benefit due to lower ongoing monitoring and due diligence costs as 
compared to those which an international investor would accrue if investing alone.  
Deals are smaller in South Africa so foreign investors could very well invest more in air 
travel and attorneys (to name two) than the actual investment, in some cases. 
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 Often where a high-status local investor is involved the venture receives instant 
credibility.   
 There is a tendency only to invest in early-stage deals where you know the market, so a 
trusted local South African co-investor is important to induce these investments and to 
make the foreign investor feel like it has the requisite knowledge to make an 
investment. 
 It’s believed that South African ventures and entrepreneurs require more hand holding 
than those in the developed world which makes having a local investor to carry out 
those functions even more valuable. 
 
5.3 Constraints 
The listings below present the responses received during the interviews.  In the discussion 
section in Chapter 6, these responses are each placed into categories, and those categories 
of responses analysed. 
 
Question 3 - What do you perceive to be the constraints to international investors co-
investing with South African investors in South African ventures? 
 Reserve bank exchange controls are a constraint due to the regulatory headaches and 
high levies.  These controls make it more difficult for the South African venture to 
transact outside of South Africa, to raise foreign debt funding (which is commonly used 
especially in Europe), and to exit to non-South African buyers.  
 IP protections are also a constraining factor in similar ways to exchange controls.   
 Political risk is a problem and although the perception among foreign investors is often 
greater than the reality, it deters investment. 
 The early stage investment deals in South Africa are generally smaller than what is seen 
in more developed markets which can make it difficult to entice foreign investors to 
invest or to even take a close look at the opportunity. 
 There may be more attractive places than South Africa to place capital at the moment.  
The opportunity costs of those foreign investors of investing in South Africa could be too 
high to justify an investment.   
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 Entrepreneurs are perceived to not be as strong as in the developed markets and will 
usually require more guidance and handholding than is usually required. 
 Fees to navigate regulatory hurdles can be great and can deter investment. 
 It is very difficult to tell the investment story for the South African early-stage 
investment asset class due to there not being many case studies or much data on 
previous deals or statistics on the local industry. 
 There have been very few notable exits in South Africa and the ability to generate 
returns consistently to domestic or international investors has not yet been adequately 
demonstrated.  
 There are limited existing relationships with investors in foreign markets which makes 
presenting opportunities and knowing who to approach challenging.   
 There is probably a dearth of bankable/investible deals in South Africa which are 
investment ready and that would be attractive to sophisticated foreign investors. 
 
Question 4 - What would be your reservations to having international co-investors? 
 Regulatory hoops (i.e., anticorruption and tax laws/requirements) which the foreign 
investor must jump through.  This reservation also applies also to DFIs who have 
mandates that include more than just return-based objectives. 
 Due diligence of the other investor(s) can be time and resource consuming. 
 Shareholder agreements can become ‘painful’ with multiple parties, especially if the 
mandates aren’t directly compatible. 
 If the investor is just a financial investor, then the South African venture capitalist would 
be hesitant to allow it into the consortium.  There is a preference for a strategic investor 
who, apart from capital, also brings a specific skill/network to the deal.  Stated another 
way, there is a reluctance to give foreign investors the good deals to those investors 
who would not be providing real value to the transaction and venture. 
 Terms and structuring may be different in the foreign market and disagreements could 
arise between the foreign investor and the South African around the proposed 
structure.   
 May differ with international investor in terms of a development strategy post-
investment. 
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 The international investor not being motivated due to the small nature of deal/market. 
 
Question 5 - What do you think the South African firms can do to attract more co-
investment from international investors?  What do they do well?  Where do they 
struggle? 
 Local investors don’t broadcast success stories as well, and when they do they are 
perhaps not packaged in way that is interesting to outside investors.  This could be 
attributable to cultural modesty or lack of experience.  
 The South African diaspora is not leveraged sufficiently in the developed world to 
facilitate relationships or to invest in their personal capacities. 
 There aren’t active strategies to facilitate and foster relationships with international 
investors and there is very little talk in the community on that topic.  
 This is a very open ecosystem in South Africa and would share quickly with an 
international investor, and does so when they are approached. 
 South Africa needs to show capacity to deliver returns, which is ultimately what will 
attract foreign investors. 
 
Question 6 - What do you think international firms could do to increase their chances of 
co-investing with South African firms into South African ventures?  Where do they need to 
improve?  What is their best chance of gaining the cooperation and interest from South 
African investors? 
 Make their intent clear, and be upfront when approaching local investors.  Clearly 
articulating the mandate of the fund/firm, and the type of investment and terms sought 
would also go a long way in improving chances. 
 Research the local market as much as possible before approaching investors or 
considering an investment here. 
 Network in local market and build relationships with investors, entrepreneurs and other 
service providers.   
 Give a clear idea of the value they bring to the transaction and venture. 
 Assist with analysing deals.  Although they are perhaps smaller than in the developed 
world, going through the motions of looking at deals together builds trust and good will.  
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Additionally, the South African investors are genuinely curious as to how the large 
international players size up a deal and thus they would be willing participants in that 
process. 
 It’s important that the foreign investor comprehends the value of having a local South 
African investor involved substantively in the transaction. 
 
5.4 Motivations 
The listings below present the responses received during the interviews.  It should be noted 
that the overall tone was positive towards the motivation to syndicate internationally.   
 
Question 7 - Please explain the rationale behind your firm's reluctance, or conversely, 
support of engaging with international investors to co-invest in South African ventures? 
 The ecosystem is a little isolated in South Africa and many haven’t spent much time 
contemplating international syndication or fostering those relationships. 
 The local practitioners are very open to internationally syndicating if there is a strategic 
fit and the international investor helps in execution of a business plan, brings a strong 
network to the table, or can facilitate future exits, to name a few.  Presently, a purely 
financial investor would be accepted but that is the case due to the current dearth of 
entrepreneurial capital in South Africa. 
 
Question 8 - When you consider syndicating with investors from developed countries, 
does your analysis of what we've discussed in this interview change based on the country 
of origin of the firm/fund?  If so, how?  If not, why do you perceive the country of origin to 
not be a material factor? 
 US or European seemed to be slightly preferred.   The preference for US and Europe 
(and UK) was that the deal flow they see is tech enabled, and the majority of the large 
exits in that space are in those markets.  Particularity, the preference for US co-investors 
was cited by two respondents was attributed to large and common exits in the US. 
 Open so long as there is an angle and value to having the investor (i.e., access to that 
market).  It’s all about the value that particular investor brings to that particular 
transaction. 
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 Language and cultural barriers were cited as potential issues if the foreign investor was 




The results from the interviews indicate that the South African venture capital professionals 
are largely willing and ready to syndicate deals with their international investment 
colleagues, with a few caveats.  The benefits they cited as inherent to internationally 
syndicated venture capital transactions are supported by the limited but bourgeoning body 
of international research.  The respondents explicitly state a high motivation and desire to 
take on international co-investment partners.  The categories of benefits where the vast 
majority of responses fell were:  access to new markets, expertise and knowledge sharing, 
stamp of approval, and access to capital.  These response categories are unpacked below. 
 
The interviews also provided valuable direction to this research on possible constraints to 
more internationally syndicated venture capital deals closing in South Africa.  Local 
practitioners, according to this research, believe that the following four categories of 
constraints are most prolific:  unsupportive regulatory environment, negative perceptions of 
investing in Africa and South Africa, relatively small deal sizes, and lack of quality 
entrepreneurs/bankable deals.  These response categories are unpacked below. 
 
Shaping the ensuing discussion is a realization by this researcher that the study of 
syndicated investments, especially early-stage internationally syndicated investments, is 
wrought with difficulty.  As described by Jaaskelainen (2006), the syndication of investments 
is an inherently multilevel phenomenon combining aspects of contracting, venture 
development, venture capital firm strategies, partnership formation and interorganizational 
networks.  With that understanding, the analysis below describes and unpacks the 
aforementioned categories of interview responses and findings in a manner consistent with 
the existing body of international research in the fields of domestic and cross-border 
syndication of venture capital investments. 
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6.2 Benefits & Motivations 
The results of the interviews indicate that the South African venture capital investors 
perceive and appreciate the value inherent in internationally syndicated venture capital 
transactions.  When asked about the benefits of such transactions, four categories of 
responses were apparent.  Again, those categories are: 
1. access to new markets,  
2. expertise and knowledge sharing, 
3. stamp of approval, and 
4. access to capital. 
 
Motivation of the local practitioners to form international syndicates also appears to not be 
an issue, as the interviewees were unanimous in their positive attitudes towards entering 
into such transactions.  While the overall responses indicated an ability and willingness to 
enter into such transactions, there are some caveats to that conclusion which are also 
unpacked herein. 
 
6.2.1 Access to New Markets    
All of the interviewees responded that a prime benefit and motivation for having an 
international investor is a perception that the venture would be able to more easily and 
quickly enter and transact in markets outside of South Africa.  This ameliorative effect was 
thought to be especially prominent in the markets where the international co-investor 
operates.  They generally believed that the international expansion would improve revenues 
and returns, and increase the venture’s likelihood of having a successful exit once it had 
scaled internationally.   
 
The respondents indicated an understanding that having foreign investors inherently brings 
advantages which increase the value of a South African venture.  The research below 
confirms and in many ways may explain the rationale for the interviewees’ views in this 
area. 
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Devigne et al. (2010) released a white paper titled, Cross-border venture capital and the 
development of portfolio companies23.  The paper was concerned with how cross-border 
venture capital investors, as opposed to domestic investors, influence the development of 
their portfolio companies.  To address that research question, a longitudinal study of 692 
European technology-based companies was undertaken, tracking mostly sales from the year 
of initial investment up to seven years after that investment.  The findings show strong 
support for their conclusion that ventures with a foreign investor exhibit higher sales 
growth, compared with companies backed by domestic investors.  The researchers also 
looked at companies backed by a syndicate of international and domestic investors; these 
companies exhibited the highest level of sales growth in the sample. 
 
The following supporting research was used to corroborate and explain the above findings.  
First, the foreign investor provides direct and relevant knowledge of certain foreign legal 
and business issues (Makela & Maula, 2005).  Second, the foreign investor may provide 
portfolio companies access to their international networks, thus reducing the liability of 
foreignness, which is likely to foster international growth (Makela & Maula, 2005; Yli-Renko 
et al., 2002).   Lastly, a foreign investor may provide the benefit of an endorsement which 
will often legitimize a company and makes mobilizing resources in the new markets easier 
(Stuart el al., 1999; Makela & Maula, 2005; Hursti & Maula, 2007). 
 
Providing additional support to the notion expressed that investors with expertise and 
networks provide value to a venture as it expands to other markets is a 2013 report by DHL 
and IHS24 titled, Internationalization – a driver for business performance.   SMEs across 12 
countries, including the G7 and BRIC economies (plus Mexico), where surveyed and 
interviewed.  The purpose of the report was to glean insights into what makes SMEs 
internationally competitive.  The table below describes one of the findings of the online 
survey administered to 410 respondents which is relevant to the research at hand. 
 
                                                          
23
 Many of the findings and methodologies of this research were peer-reviewed and published in the 2010 
edition of Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research.  The working paper was also presented on several occasions. 
24
 IHS provides industry data, technical documents, custom software applications, and consulting services to 
international clients.  It is an NYSE listed company with USD 1.3bn in revenues in 2011. 
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Table 6:  Looking at the last two years, what were the three main challenges you 
encountered when developing exports? 
 
















Establishing contacts with foreign 
partners and/or a foreign customer 
base 
24% 21% 23% 
Lack of knowledge of foreign markets 14% 29% 19% 
High customs duties in the destination 
country 
12% 15% 13% 
Regulations in the destination country 15% 0% 10% 
Quality of logistics services 8% 10% 9% 
  (Source:  2013 DHL and IHS SME report) 
 
The top 2 challenges identified for exporting abroad, from SMEs who already were 
successfully doing so, were establishing contacts with foreign partners and lack of 
knowledge of that foreign market.  From the BRIC respondents, 21% and 29% identified the 
challenge, respectively.  The report also found that BRIC countries are more likely to trade 
internationally than their G7 peers.  One explanation for that phenomenon is that emerging 
market SMEs must often trade internationally to become a substantial business given the 
relatively small domestic markets in which they operate.   
 
The interviewees also exhibited an understanding and appreciation of the benefit of 
increased exit potential to international syndication.  Two respondents went as far as to say 
that the reason they showed a bias toward co-investing with US based investors is the 
desire to tap into the exit opportunities available in that market.  The research below 
confirms and in many ways may explain the rationale for the interviewees’ views in this 
area. 
 
Possessing an international investor involved in a venture, and/or a management team with 
significant international business experiences, increases the likelihood of a successful IPO in 
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a foreign market to the venture.  A 2003 study published in the Journal of Business 
Venturing by Hursti and Maula proves this propensity.  The study begins with the 
proposition that venture capital is likely only to flourish where IPOs are a possibility.  This is 
the case due to the high valuations (and thus high IRRs attributed to ventures which lists) 
associated with IPOs, relative to the other methods of exiting an investment.  Without an 
IPO as a viable exit option the returns aren’t as great to the investor and the high risk of 
making an early stage investment is more difficult to justify.  The researchers found a home 
bias inherent in many domestic equity exchanges which increases the complexities to a 
foreign venture attempting list on that exchange.  Further, they found that the likelihood of 
a foreign IPO was positively correlated to the international experience of the management 
team, whether the business seeking the foreign IPO had existing international operations, 
and the presence of foreign venture capitalists and/or ownership.  The foreign exchange’s 
home bias is reduced most prominently in the market where the investors operate, but also 
in all other foreign markets.   
 
South Africa does not have a strong IPO market.  Although the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) in South Africa is the largest on the African Continent, globally it is the 18th 
largest, with a market capitalization of ca. USD 903bn (much of which is attributable to 
mining and natural resource companies).  By increasing the chances that a South African 
venture has of listing on a foreign exchange, the investment proposition changes 
dramatically.  In South Africa, trade sales are presently the most viable mechanism to exit an 
investment.  While more success stories are needed, a recent and notable exit provides 
hope.  That exit was a USD 110mn trade sale of Fundamo to VISA in the US which was led by 
Mark Shuttleworth’s venture fund called HBD. 
 
6.2.2 Expertise and Knowledge Sharing 
The interviewees indicated that expertise and knowledge sharing were key drivers and 
benefits of internationally syndicated venture capital investments in South Africa.  They 
recognized that in South Africa, practitioners tend to be generalists while in the more 
developed economies, due to competitive and other forces, people and firms often 
specialize.   The local venture capital industry is new and as such value was recognized in 
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having international investors to verify local best practices, and suggest new and perhaps 
more effective deal approaches.  Also mentioned was the perception that transaction costs 
are reduced where the foreign investor could more easily evaluate the merits of the 
business and investment, including the expansion opportunities of the business.   
 
The interviewees perceived the value of their local expertise to be of high value in de-risking 
the transaction, and reducing costs of due diligence and other transaction costs.  The 
respondents largely felt that their value was amplified in a place like South Africa which 
often requires more hand holding of entrepreneurs and young businesses than in more 
developed ecosystems.   Prior research in this area largely confirms these perceptions, and 
that research is explained below. 
 
As to the portfolio company, the aforementioned 2010 whitepaper titled, Cross-border 
venture capital and the development of portfolio companies illustrates the advantages.  
Again, the findings showed that by often sharing information and expertise at various levels 
of the transaction, returns were improved through increased sales/revenues to the venture 
and also improved were the downstream exit results.   
 
In Determinants of Cross-Border Syndication:  Cultural Barriers, Legal Context, and Learning, 
Meuleman and Wright (2008) showed that private equity investors (including venture 
capitalists) often use syndication to overcome cultural, legal and other nuances of the local 
market.  They also found that as the foreign firm gained local knowledge through 
transactions and other experiences, the use of syndication would often diminish.   The 
gleanings were derived from an analysis of 754 transactions, by 69 different firms.  All of the 
investors in the sample were UK based, and investing into various European countries over 
the period from 1990 to 2005.  The majority of the transactions involved buyouts, thus 
making the results not perfectly generalizable to this research.  It is likely that Meuleman 
and Wright (2008) understate the importance of knowledge sharing for purposes of 
understanding venture capital transactions.  This is the case because early-stage 
investments require more handholding and monitoring, support function budgets are 
smaller due to reduced fund sizes, and competent expert advice can have a greater impact 
in a company which is in the process of forming. 
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The local investor is often tasked with the ongoing monitoring of the investment, and 
assisting in the day-to-day management issues of the venture.  The importance of the 
syndicate relationship in reducing these monitoring costs is illustrated in the previously 
described research by Makela and Maula (2008) titled, Attracting cross-border venture 
capital:  the role of the local investor.  Because the local investor is closer to the venture, 
and has valuable local knowledge, it is often able to monitor and support a venture more 
effectively and cost-efficiently than the international counterpart.  Similar research by Dai et 
al. (2012), and Fritsch and Schilder (2008), also confirm these findings. 
 
The existing body of research supports the idea that developed world investors are valuable 
to a transaction due to their highly specialized knowledge.  Two published pieces which 
implicitly illustrate that proposition are Reconsidering the venture capitalists’ “value added” 
proposition: An interorganizational learning perspective by Busenitz et al. (2004), and 
Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms:  Empirical evidence by Hellman 
and Puri (2002).  In relatively underdeveloped venture capital markets, one would expect 
the specialized value of more experienced foreign investors to be of even more importance 
than these research pieces suggests as they looked mainly at developed world transactions. 
 
In South Africa, it is unlikely that the value of the international investor will diminish 
anytime soon.  As illustrated in the surveys administered to South African practitioners by 
Portman (2013), the focus of the local industry has moved to later stage deals.  As a result, 
local learning and expertise is likely not increasing at sufficient rates to lessen learning gaps 
with potential international co-investment partners.  The South African practitioners seem 
to grasp the importance of knowledge and expertise sharing, and encouraging international 
syndication is one way of facilitating knowledge flows from the developed world to South 
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6.2.3 Stamp of Approval 
The respondents believed that bringing in a high-status international investor could lead to 
better exit outcomes, higher likelihoods of successful future funding rounds, and instant 
local prestige.  This they attributed to the stamp of approval effect that certain investors 
possess to validate a local portfolio company.  They noted that the positive effects would 
manifest most prominently when the international investor itself had a high-status.  Only 
one of the interviewees mentioned the stamp of approval effect in the converse direction.  
That being that by having a local investor with a high-status, many of the same benefits 
attributable to a high-status international investor can also shift to the venture.    
 
Much of the research on status and its impact on business and relationships springs from 
the seminal research in that field by Podolny (2005).  Two relevant pieces from the 
literature on status transfer and venture capital are analysed below. 
 
The first, a 2010 piece published in the Academy of Management Journal by Guler and 
Guillen titled, Home-country networks and foreign expansion: evidence form the venture 
capital industry.  Using data on the foreign market entries of 1,010 US venture capital firms 
from the VentureXpert database, robust support was found for the notion that social status 
of the international investor has a material effect on investment performance.  The social 
status transfer, they argued, is important as it involves the imagery of a hierarchy of position 
which assists in attracting capital and negotiating with suppliers, along with other important 
advantages.  A limitation of this study for this research’s purposes is that it involves US 
based venture capital firms which expand through opening offices in foreign markets, not 
through international syndication.  Expanding through opening an office means that the 
high-status international investor maintains control of its brand, and may be more likely to 
bring further resources to the transaction to protect the brand’s perceived high-status.  In a 
syndicate arrangement, it’s conceivable that the high-status investor, having less skin in the 
game may be less incentivized on this front. Even with those limitations, the principle that 
high-status firms can transfer that status to ventures and partners in other countries is 
shown, and helps explain this research’s interview findings. 
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An earlier piece by Stuart et al. (1999) looked at the rates of IPOs, and market capitalization 
of IPOs in 301 young biotech venture capital backed companies25.  They showed that those 
ventures with prominent and high-status affiliates and investors perform better.  A core 
finding was that young companies with prominent business partners perform better than 
comparable firms that lack such partners.  This phenomenon was attributed to status 
transfer, which builds confidence about the venture among suppliers, customers, 
employers, collaborators and investors.   Simply put, high-status firm have likely earned 
their status, in one way or the other, and are thus better equipped to provide value-added 
advice and services to the venture.   
 
When co-investing with high-status international investors the benefits which can accrue to 
the venture and local investors are supported by the interviews in this research, and by the 
body of academic literature.  One implication of this finding is that when internationally 
syndicating, it would behove the South African investors and/or venture to seek out high-
status foreign investors.  The status transfer that occurs to both parties has been shown to 
carry substantial benefit to the portfolio company, making future capital raises easier, and 
IRRs to the investors more attractive. 
 
6.2.4 Access to Capital 
A common refrain vis-à-vis benefits of international syndication from the interviewees were 
in the category of improved access to capital.  They acknowledged that the local venture 
capital ecosystem is thin and that access to capital is a significant challenge.  They believed 
that having a gateway to the international capital markets would allow for more deals, 
larger deals, and to more easily and effectively make follow-on investments.  A preference 
for strategic investors (i.e., those who bring more than just capital to the table) was strongly 
expressed.  In this vein, two interviewees indicated they would only reluctantly co-invest 
with a purely financial investor.   
 
 
                                                          
25
 It’s not entirely clear whether all of the firms in the sample where from the US.  The supplementary data on 
patents in the field was derived on US companies. 
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The table below shows the venture capital investments in 2012 in selected countries outside 
of South Africa: 
 











US $26.5bn 1 to 1 26.5bn 3698 
UK £5.7bn 1 to 1.64 9.33bn 820 
Germany €521mn 1 to 1.37 714.5mn 748 
      36.54bn 5266 
        (source:  NAVCA, BVC and BVCA databases) 
 
The impact of diverting only a small flow from those sources could have a dramatic impact 
on the local ecosystem.   The 2012 SAVCA Venture Solutions VC survey shows that from 2009 
to the first half of 2012, there were 103 venture capital transactions in South Africa, with a 
value of ZAR 835mn (or USD 83mn assuming a 10 to 1 exchange rate) invested over that 
period in the asset class.  That level of activity represents a fraction of what was 
experienced in 2012 alone in the US, UK and Germany. 
6.2.5 Motivations 
The motivation to syndicate with international investors was very high and unanimous 
among the interviewees.  Often they felt isolated in South Africa, and were especially open 
to this form of a partnership where they perceived the value coming from the international 
investor was more than capital, and if it was a strategic fit for the venture.  Most of the 
responses were not biased in terms of which nation the co-investors derived, but 2 
interviewees expressed an interest in investors from the US due to cultural and language 
similarities.  These respondents cited a preference for a US investment partner also due to 
the perception that gaining access to markets, networks and exit opportunities in the US 
would be easier with such an investor in the consortium.  Specifically one interviewee noted 
that the US market is vast, and most of the major tech-enabled exits come from US listings. 
 
In terms of the country bias expressed by some of the venture capitalists in favour of co-
investing with US based investors and venture capital firms, prior research does shed light 
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onto why this may be the case.  Soderblom and Wiklund (2006) prepared a review of the 
relevant literature on venture performance for a UK government agency26 with the aim of 
presenting and drawing conclusions from over 120 peer reviewed papers.  One conclusion 
which these researchers derived is that due to the breadth of the US venture capital 
markets, firms and investors in the US will generally have stronger screening mechanisms, 
existing strategic partnership, higher deal flow, superior ability to structure investments, 
and strong negotiating skills relative to their UK counterparts.  The UK is the second largest 
venture capital market in the world, so there is at least a suggestion that these conclusions 
would hold for other European and developed markets.   
 
Another conclusion of that literature review was that US firms value the contributions of a 
local co-investor more than their European counterparts (see Schwienbacher, 2008).  One 
reasons for this, they discussed, is that European venture capitalists are less active and limit 
their value-adding ability to making deals, whereas the Americans tend to add value through 
actively monitoring and supporting portfolio companies. As evidence for this conclusion, 
they point to a study by Sapienza et al. (1996) which surveyed the backgrounds of venture 
capitalists in the UK and found that most had banking and financial backgrounds, while their 
counterparts in the US contained more diversity and participants with entrepreneurial and 
other technical backgrounds.   
 
The interviewees said emphatically that they are motivated to internationally syndicate, and 
it’s beyond the scope of this research to question those seemingly genuinely-held 
assertions.  Assuming that motivation is not an issue, the issue of country bias was identified 
in the course of the interviews.  A scan of the available literature shows that the not often 
expressed bias towards co-investing with US investors has logical underpinnings supported 
by the literature.   
 
6.2.6 Caveats 
Although the interviewees in the sample exhibited a desire to syndicate internationally, and 
recognized the benefits, there are some notable caveats to this research’s findings that 
                                                          
26
 The Small Business Services (SBS) agency. 
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South African venture capital investors are ready and willing to syndicate with their 
colleagues in other markets.  These caveats may cast some doubt on the readiness and 
willingness assertion, and also help to indicate areas to be explored in future research.  
Those caveats are firstly, that there is evidence that South African investors may be inclined 
to withhold the best deals from their international investor colleagues.  Second, South 
African venture investment managers may be focused on too many factors other than IRR 
so as to be a deterrent to attracting international conventional co-investment partners.  
Lastly, the benefit of increased on-going commitment in internationally syndicate backed 
ventures was not raised in the interview responses which, although not likely a material 
omission, is worth exploring. 
 
6.2.6.1 Cream Skimming 
Cream skimming is the notion that comparing international venture capital returns to those 
in more developed economies is difficult due to venture capitalists in smaller markets only 
funding the best and brightest ventures, leaving the rest unfunded and thus not part of the 
return profile for the country (Guler & McGahan, 2006).  Going further, the aforementioned 
Guler and McGahan (2006) research cited a key impediment to cross-border syndication 
being that lead investors may choose to not solicit foreign investors in an attempt to not 
dilute favourable future returns.  Indirectly, this suggestion that cream skimming and other 
agency type problems inherently slow rates of international syndication is supported by 
other research (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Filatotchev, et al., 2006). 
 
Cream skimming may be relevant to this research and analysis due to the interviewees 
expressing a slight propensity to keep the good deals for the local investors, while allowing 
international investors into those deals only when the strategic value they bring is clear.  
This is a natural and human phenomenon, as represented by Guler and McGahan (2006) 
and one not unique to South Africa.   Cestone et al. (2007) found that the greater the 
experience gap between the investors, the more a premium the less experienced lead 
investor had to pay (by way of reduced valuation and dilution of certain rights) to entice the 
experienced investor to join the syndicate.  South African investors may intuitively 
understand this and rightfully be not eager to pay that premium. 
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The implication here could be simply that South African venture capitalists are similar to all 
other venture capitalist in that they want to maximize returns.  They will seek other 
investors, either domestically or internationally, when it makes financial sense to do so.  The 
concern, however, is that if cream skimming is occurring in South Africa then the 
international investors aren’t seeing the best and most interesting deals, and the best local 
ventures may not be receiving the benefits which have been herein discussed of having a 
high-status foreign investor.  These and other agency issues are important to understand, 
and the academic literature on agency issues’ impact on international syndicate 
relationships is lacking and represents a sizable gap.   The inclusion of cream skimming in 
this analysis of caveats is to highlight that gap, and suggest that given the unique history of 
South Africa, and periods of isolation from the international business communities, there 
may be more to this than at first meets the eye.   
 
6.2.6.2 Attention to IRR 
Almost missed in the analysis by this researcher was a recognition that the majority of the 
responses on international syndication revolved around benefits to the portfolio company, 
and not to the venture capital firm and investors.  One strong exception was the investor in 
the sample with by far the most international experiences, who responded that returns and 
ability to deliver great returns should be at the centre of any syndicate relationship.  He 
suggested throughout the interview that South Africa will receive more international 
investment when it more clearly demonstrates an ability to generate returns.    
 
More research is required to understand whether this is a significant phenomenon.  It could 
very well be that the other respondents implicitly understood the benefits at the investor-
level, but opted instead to dance around that topic in favour of highlighting the benefits to 
the portfolio company.  Alternatively, it could be a sign of something more serious and point 
towards a material issue which could hamper future international syndication in South 
Africa.  A large majority of capital raised by venture capital funds operating in South Africa 
comes from DFIs or other sources which aren’t 100% return driven.   The entities normally 
have objectives which are to them as important as IRR is to the more sophisticated private 
investors in the developed world.  Because DFIs are not as IRR focused as traditional 
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investors, it may be the case that South African venture investors weaned on investing DFI 
capital may find difficulty squeezing into and/or leading an international syndicate of 
traditional venture investors.  As with cream skimming, the causal links from the interview 
data are not at first blush strong, and mentioned herein to highlight a potential issue that 
could be worth further exploration.  
 
6.2.6.3 On-going Commitment Benefit 
A benefit that was not mentioned in any of the interviews is the positive effect of on-going 
commitment to a venture backed by an international syndicate.  By increasing the continued 
support and commitment to the venture, the likelihood of future and rigorous monitoring, 
further funding and incentive to leverage personal and professional networks on the 
venture’s behalf theoretically should also increase (Makela & Maula, 2006).  As with the 
scant mention to IRR, interpreting this omission is difficult and may not be a sign that the 
local practitioners aren’t intuitively aware of this benefit.  The fact that it wasn’t mentioned 
does, however, suggest that an opportunity exists in this area to educate local practitioners 
on this benefit of syndicating internationally.  It is a very powerful argument for co-investing 
internationally that shouldn’t be ignored.  A study in 2006 by Makela and Maula shows that 
benefit.   
 
In that 2006 research, the commitment theory was applied to prior research in cross-border 
syndication, and conclusions drawn.   Commitment theory, in this context, looks to explain 
the dynamics between individuals on an interorganizational level which impact levels of 
commitment to the various parties.  It was found that having a local co-investment partner 
tends to induce higher levels of on-going support and commitment by the foreign co-
investor.  The effect diminishes with less distance between the foreign investor and the 
country of investment, if the foreign investor has other investments in that market, and 
where the deals are larger.   In South Africa’s case, it is quite far from any concentrated pool 
of experienced investors, and has not received much foreign venture investment so one 
would expect this on-going commitment effect to be strong. 
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6.3 Constraints 
The interviewees recognized and provided valuable guidance in determining what the 
constraints and impediments are to the formation of more internationally syndicated 
venture investments in South Africa.  Many of the responses were those which are familiar 
to most international transactions, and thus were largely excluded from further analysis.  
Those excluded responses include: 
1. fees to navigate regulations,  
2. due diligence requirements of other investors,  
3. incompatible mandates, and 
4. disagreements as to the venture’s development strategy. 
 
First, the fees to navigate regulations as an impediment are relevant to any international 
transaction, and further analysis was deemed to be immaterial in gaining insights relevant 
to this research.  Fees are also discussed indirectly in the regulations as constraints section 
and subsections. 
 
Second, due diligence of new investors, especially when from foreign markets, is a cost 
consistent to any serious international transaction.  Relating to the third point, when those 
mandates aren’t compatible, the costs and difficulty in creating suitable structures can 
constrain the transaction.   This is not a situation unique to South Africa, and this researcher 
did not uncover any convincing evidence which would debunk that assertion. 
 
Lastly, there will inevitably always be a possibility of disagreements occurring as to future 
development plans of a venture.  It’s not clear to this researcher that those disagreements 
would be more pronounced when South African investors are involved, and no data or other 
indicator gives this researcher any cause to believe that such a condition exists. 
 
The tenor of these four excluded points is confirmed in research by Du (2009) and can be 
lumped together.   In that research, Du looked at 3,385 US companies that received first 
round financing from venture capital syndicates between 1995 and 2005.  The findings 
suggested that companies with disparate investment partners in a syndicate were more 
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likely to fail early, took longer to become profitable, and had lower rates of IPO.  However, 
the researcher also found evidence that investment partners who are different often help 
firms thrive long term, and this was attributed to the additional costs borne and knowledge 
exchanged early in the venture while working to make the venture work.27  While not 
directly applicable to this research, Du (2009) supports the interviewees concerns that 
increased costs of having an international co-investor are valid constraints for 
consideration.28 
 
Two other points are omitted from direct analysis in this sub-Chapter, and those are:  
limited relationships with international investors, and a material preference for strategic 
over purely financial investors.  Both points are addressed indirectly throughout the 
analysis, and specifically the constraining factor of limited relationships is dealt with in the 
Policy Suggestions chapter.  The potential impact of not preferring purely financial investors 
is addressed directly in the Caveats sub-Chapter in the cream skimming analysis. 
The remaining responses from the interviewees fell into four categories and are further 
unpacked in the ensuing 4 subsections, which are: 
1. unsupportive regulatory environment, 
2. negative perceptions of investing in Africa and South Africa, 
3. small deal sizes, and 
4. lack of quality entrepreneurs/bankable deals. 
 
6.3.1 Unsupportive Regulatory Environment  
The impact of exchange control regulations and IP protection regulations were mentioned 
by all of the respondents as constraining factors.  Although not mentioned, BBBEE is a topic 
which was suggested in Brent et al. (2004) as a potentially material influencer on syndicated 
private equity transactions in South Africa which their questionnaire did not address, and 
that is one reason a BBBEE analysis is included herein. 
                                                          
27
 It should be noted that this research deals with international syndication, and the costs saved by having a 
local co-investment partner are substantial and would in most cases outweigh the costs associated with 
heterogeneous partnerships.  Du’s research looked at domestic syndication, and the model used to reach the 
conclusions included physical distance between investors as one variable of many. 
28
 Du represents the only known research to this researcher in the space of syndication of venture capital 
investments that has findings showing negative attributes of syndication.   
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6.3.1.1 Exchange Controls 
Exchange controls are government restrictions on the movement of currency between 
countries (SARB, 2013).  In the developed markets, controls such as these are rare and 
where present lax.  In the African Continent, however, they are quite common and South 
Africa is no exception.   
 
A recent South African Supreme Court case involving the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
and renowned entrepreneur, philanthropist and venture investor Mark Shuttleworth has 
brought the issue of exchange controls and their effects (both positive and negative) into 
the limelight (Shuttleworth v SARB, 2013).  In that case, the South African born Shuttleworth 
sued claiming exchange control levies were an unconstitutional taking and that the manner 
of enforcement represented a violation of the due process rights of South Africans.  The 
impetus for the suit was the desire to reclaim a levy enforced by SARB to the tune of ca. USD 
30mn.  Shuttleworth lost on both counts, and his arguments and subsequent holding by the 
South African court offer fodder for understanding exchange controls in the context of 
international syndication. 
 
South Africa has long employed exchange controls to combat capital flight and to ease 
balance of payments pressures, and the most stringent enforcement of these measures 
came in in the 80s and 90s.  During that period, the hold on the government by the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Party was waning and exchange controls were one tool utilised to prop 
up the apartheid government.  The controls have been partially maintained since then, and 
remain one of the vestiges of the former government which the ANC has opted to not 
dismantle.   
 
The primary argument against free flows of capital, argue some governments and reserve 
banks, is that controlling those flows gives economies more stability and independence.  
Domestic monetary policy alone is ineffective in staving off capital account deterioration, 
inflation and currency devaluation for smaller economies in a global environment of 
seemingly endless rounds of quantitative easing (The Economist, 2013). 
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Views which oppose exchange controls are often political and fairness based, and the 
primary financial argument deals with investment irreversibility.  By taking away the ability 
to easily repatriate funds, investment is deterred (Farrell & Todani, 2004).  Additionally, as 
cited in the Shuttleworth suit (Shuttleworth v SARB, 2013), controls can also make running 
philanthropic and business transactions outside of South Africa very difficult.  Large 
institutions and banks in South Africa avoid these layers of red tape and levies often through 
opening shell companies in countries like Mauritius to run their international operations and 
transactions.  This of course results in a loss of jobs and tax revenues to South Africa.  
Unfortunately, opening shell companies in other countries is not a viable option for most 
small and medium sized job creating businesses who desire to transact outside of South 
Africa, or attract foreign investment.   
 
Exchange controls in South Africa have been loosened considerably since 1994.  The main 
hurdles remaining which would affect an internationally syndicated venture capital 
transaction in South Africa are the requirement to receive permission from SARB to dispose 
of assets which non-residents are owners; borrow locally for companies owned 75% or more 
by non-residents; pay remittance of royalties, license fees and patent fees to a non-resident; 
pay dividends and interest to non-residents in certain instances; invest outside of the 
country if a South African corporate; import and export in certain instances; and more.  
Adding more meat to the skeleton, one of the interviewees specifically mentioned the 
difficulty of arranging debt transactions with international investors29 into South African 
businesses.  The reason for this is that each interest payment to the international investors 
can be required to go through the SARB approval process often making the cost of debt 
transactions prohibitive.  This matters because adding debt to the capital structure is a 
potent de-risking measure which can help induce investment and reduce the weighted 
average cost of capital. One of the difficulties in researching this sub-topic, and in complying 
with SARB regulations, is that the rules are not clearly spelled out.   It seems to this 
researcher30 that the SARB is given a good deal of discretion in interpreting and enforcing 
the provisions.   
 
                                                          
29
 Europeans in particular appreciate debt-like investments in early-stage ventures. 
30
 The researcher is a US trained and licensed (inactive) attorney possessing the degree of Juris Doctorate. 
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The impact of exchange controls on the international syndication of venture capital 
investments in South Africa is potentially profound, and not well researched or described.  
First, at the venture attractiveness level, South African ventures are placed at a 
disadvantage out of the gate when looking to trade abroad and internationalize.  The 
exchange control hurdles are time consuming from a compliance standpoint, and assuming 
the transaction or capital flow are approved negatively impacts the return profile of the 
investment.  Shuttleworth, a powerful and wealthy South African was unable to comply and 
remain as profitable as he desired.  Large institutions like Standard Bank in South Africa 
have voted with their feet and run their international transactions in places like Mauritius to 
avoid the levies and red tape imposed by the SARB.  These costs and preventative measures 
affect profitability. 
 
Second, exchange controls can complicate the funding structure especially where 
international debt is involved.  Debt interest payments must often go through the SARB 
approval process, and this can be a cost prohibitive and time consuming exercise.   
 
Third, exits are a real issue vis-à-vis exchange controls and perhaps the most important.  
When it is time to sell a business, the transaction must be approved by SARB if to a foreign 
investor or if the company is to be listed on a foreign exchange.  This has the impact of in 
many ways limiting the universe of purchasers of the successful future business to those 
residing and operating in South Africa.  A smaller supply of potential purchasers usually will 
lead to lower valuations caused by reduced or no competitive tensions among interested 
buyers.  For foreign companies who do ultimately purchase, the cost of complying with 
exchange control requirements are factored into the valuation and those costs will be borne 
by the entrepreneurs and original investors.  This reduces the likelihood of the sale 
occurring in the first place, as well as the overall IRR on the investment.  These impacts are 
felt early in the venture’s funding process, and will ultimately lead to lower early valuations 
and other concessions to entice domestic or international investors. 
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6.3.1.2 Intellectual Property (IP) Protections 
Kaplan et al. (2009) state that in general IP protections in South Africa are quite strong and 
easy and relatively inexpensive for which to file applications.  South Africa normally ranks 
high among developing countries in terms of patent regime strength, and holds its own 
when compared to developed countries.  This is good news, and investors considering an 
investment in a South African venture appreciate these protections. 
 
In terms of constraining international syndication, the interviewees raised IP protections as 
an issue due to the difficulty in South Africa of exporting IP.  It is important to be able to 
export IP for at least one important reason, exits.  When restrictions are placed on a 
domestic venture’s capacity to list on foreign exchange, or be purchased by a foreign entity, 
the entire value proposition for the investment is materially changed.       
 
The exchange controls regulations, as previously described, apply in the case of IP transfers 
as IP is treated like capital.  As such, the general rule is that no South African Intellectual 
Property may be exported outside of South Africa, or to a non-resident, without SARB 
permission.  In addition to having to comply with exchange controls provisions, the IP will 
also go through various levels of approval through the IP regulations in the country aimed at 
keeping certain valuable IP in South Africa.   
 
Savvy South African entrepreneurs and investors avoid these regulations by transferring all 
IP out of South Africa as soon as possible in the company’s lifecycle.  The earlier the better, 
as that is normally when the IP is valued at a low enough valuation to avoid these 
regulations and levies outright, or to reduce the ultimate burdens of compliance.  The 
foreign company which then holds the IP will often license it back to the South African 
company.  Once the IP is outside of the country, the jurisdiction of South Africa to tax or 
regulate that foreign company largely disappears. The purchaser and seller of the IP would 
then not be subject to exchange controls or levies.  Although the profoundly negative 
effects of exchange controls and IP protections to the international syndication of venture 
capital investments in South Africa can be mitigated through proper planning, a layer of 
transaction costs and complexities are introduced which can distract the investors and 
69 | P a g e  
 
entrepreneurs from the ultimate aim of the partnership which is to grow a sustainable and 
profitable business.  
 
6.3.1.3 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
Interestingly, BBBEE was scantily mentioned by the interviewees as a constraint.  The 
general finding that South African practitioners don’t rate BBBEE as a material factor in 
domestic venture capital transactions is confirmed by research by Jones (2009) where South 
African venture capital and private equity practitioners were surveyed and selectively 
interviewed on a variety of topics.  He noticed that in spite of a stream of literature 
indicating that labour law rigidity (including BBBEE) negatively impacts venture capital 
investments, it was not ranked as a material concern or issue with his respondents.   
 
There are at least a few explanations for the omission of any discussion of BBBEE by the 
respondents in this research.  First, the omission could be due to the fact that most startups 
and early-stage ventures don’t have sufficient revenues to fall within the BBBEE code’s 
jurisdiction.  Second, startups which would be attractive to venture capitalists have the 
capacity to scale outside of South Africa relatively quickly, and/or don’t rely substantially on 
government contracts, thus making a positive BBBEE score of relative unimportance.   
 
Third, and a more controversial explanation is that due to the racial makeup of qualified 
entrepreneurs opting to devote themselves to running a startup and pursue financing it 
could be that local practitioners don’t have enough experience dealing with South African 
black run venture backed companies to grasp the benefits which government preferences 
(or lack thereof) can have on a new venture.  Some argue that BBBEE has had the 
unintended consequence of creating very attractive corporate jobs for qualified South 
African blacks, making entrepreneurialism and the risk associated with that choice 
unpalatable relative to the multitude of other options.  This sentiment has been expressed 
by the brother of a former South African post-apartheid President Thabo Mbeki, and he 
(in)famously has argued that “…it [BEE] strikes the fatal blow against the emergence of black 
entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony 
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capitalists made up of ANC politicians, some retired and others not, who have become 
strong allies of the economic oligarchy.” (Mbeki, 2009: 61).    
 
Assuming this later theory has credence, the fact that many corporate jobs are largely out of 
reach for a significant swath of white male South Africans could be further confounding the 
problem.  These white male South Africans are often forced to emigrate or innovate by 
starting and seeking funding for an entrepreneurial venture of their own.  One of the worst 
case scenarios for South Africa could be to create a class of largely white entrepreneurs with 
limited support and relationships to the various government actors, and a class of largely 
black South African corporate employees without a desire to receive the numerous levels of 
support in starting and growing entrepreneurial ventures offered them by the South African 
government and other institutions.  Lingelbach et al. (2009) also noticed and described this 
trend, and attributed the fall of venture capital in South African in part to the growing divide 
between the predominately white investors and entrepreneurs, and mostly black 
government actors in the mid-late 90s. 
 
The omission of BBBEE as a constraint to international syndication in South Africa is 
interesting to this researcher.  It’s interesting because the way in which BBBEE shapes 
transactions, shareholdings, and the ability of the venture to compete in South Africa should 
be a material consideration.  To begin the analysis of that impact, a basic description of a 
typical BBBEE transaction in South Africa is proffered to serve as a backdrop.  In order to 
gain BBBEE points, which are used to increase the likelihood of receiving government 
tenders and other competitive advantages, companies will sometimes engage in a sale of 
equity in order to increase the percentage of the company owned by non-white South 
Africans.  The new owners, if they fall into a previously disadvantaged category (e.g., black 
South African, coloureds31, some Chinese, and Indians) will add to the company’s BBBEE 
scorecard which leads to preferential right on a number of levels.32   Generally, the BBBEE 
partner does not contribute its own capital.  Instead, a bank is brought into the transaction 
                                                          
31
 The description of a group of people in South Africa attributed to a variety of lineages.  The description while 
offensive in the US and other countries is common and widely accepted with no negative connotation 
associated with its usage in South Africa. 
32
 Additionally, other companies receive points for doing business with high-scoring BBBEE companies so 
transactions with private sector companies can also become much easier and more profitable. 
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to lend the BBBEE partner capital to then purchase shares from the company.  The shares 
are held by the bank as collateral, and personal guarantees are then offered by the company 
promising repayment.  The BBBEE partner repays the bank principal and interest payments 
with dividends received.  These transactions can become quite complicated and tailor-made 
to individual situations.  However, most of the BBBEE transactions which this researcher has 
reviewed resemble the aforementioned arrangement.  
 
Theoretically, all parties benefit in such a transaction.  The BBBEE partner receives equity in 
a company and takes no risks.  The bank receives interest and has guarantees and collateral 
protecting its downside.  The company increases its BBBEE score and thus is able to more 
effectively compete in the South African marketplace.  Lastly, society is improved as more 
previously disadvantaged categories of people have a stake in the economy.   
 
An understanding of this structure helps illuminate the practice’s potential impact on 
internationally syndicated venture capital backed transactions in South Africa.  From the 
foreign investor’s perspective, the transaction will inevitably seem unusual and in many 
ways incongruent with their views of how a company ought to be structured and how value 
is created.  Allocating shares based on primarily racial considerations is not common in the 
more developed markets, and the complexity of many of the transactions could scare away 
an investor not familiar with the practice.   
 
The foreign investors may also struggle to fit into a syndicate without damaging the 
company or lowering its existing BBBEE score.  When new shares are issued to the 
international investor the diluting effect of that transaction could damage the management 
team’s incentive and alignment with the company if their shareholdings become too low.  
The dilution can also cause the black-ownership percentage to reduce, thereby making the 
company less competitive in South Africa. 
 
Monitoring after the investment has been made is a primary advantage of having a local co-
investor, as has been previously discussed.  If the BBBEE partner does not have the capacity 
or desire to monitor the local venture for the international investor, then that benefit is 
eliminated from the analysis of whether to internationally syndicate.  Another investor with 
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that capacity in the local market could be brought in, but once again there may not be 
room, and if there is there may be consequences to diluting the BBBEE partners and 
management team.  As such, ventures seeking to both secure international capital and have 
a high BBBEE score should seek out BBBEE partners who will either manage the venture or 
will be able and willing to offer monitoring services in line with the international investor’s 
expectations.  
 
So as not to be misunderstood, this researcher believes that the aims of BBBEE are mostly 
noble and that there are many benefits to the government action of encouraging and 
enforcing racial quotas in private businesses, especially in a country with South Africa’s 
recent history.  It is probably a necessary mechanism to correct the wrongs of the past and 
to bring more previously disadvantage categories of peoples into the South African 
economy.  Few would argue against that.  This research aims to look primarily at the 
influence of BBBEE on internationally syndicated venture capital transactions, and has the 
luxury of ignoring and discounting the very important social and political rationale behind 
the code’s creation. 
 
6.3.2 Negative Perceptions 
The interviewees occasionally mentioned negative perceptions of the investment climate in 
South Africa as a possible constraint to the formation of an internationally syndicated 
venture capital investment.  This is likely not an irrational concern.  In the years of 2012 and 
2013, the South Africa’s government bond rating was downgraded by Moodys to Baaa1; 
BMW halted expansion plans citing labour unrest concerns; high unemployment and 
inflation persisted; energy shortfalls remained an issue; and 44 striking mine workers were 
killed at Marikana by South African police which represented the single most lethal use of 
threat by a South African security force since 1960.  Clearly, that list paints a dire picture to 
international observers. 
 
These negative perceptions can be difficult (and expensive) to overcome.  Investors are 
compensated for risks such as these through higher premiums and returns, which are often 
possible in a place like South Africa due to lower competition and abilities to take advantage 
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of more and deeper arbitrage opportunities.  However, when the perceived risk is higher 
than the actual risk the South African investors and entrepreneur are theoretically giving to 
much alpha away to the international investor in compensation for that risk.  It also 
removes from consideration many investment opportunities which would otherwise be 
attractive in an environment where risk was correctly perceived.  As a more general point, 
perceptions such as these may even deter international investors from taking a close look at 
South Africa as an investment destination in the first place, especially into a risky asset class 
like venture capital. 
 
It should be noted, the news hasn’t all been bad.  Recently, South Africa has been invited to 
join the BRIC consortium of nations, received direct foreign investment from WalMart, 
maintained its status as economic superpower on the Continent, seen the ascent of Cyril 
Ramaphosa33 in the ANC party, and other positive items.  South Africa is the most developed 
country in sub-Saharan Africa by a wide margin, and has first world calibre infrastructure 
and institutions.  Serious investors looking to make investments in Africa would certainly 
have South Africa on their shortlist due to excellent management teams, relatively liquid 
capital markets and high standards of corporate governance.   
 
Challenges around negative perception are not new to sub-Saharan African countries, 
including South Africa.  However, the available evidence suggests that the tide is turning in 
favour of South Africa and other African countries.  An article by the Economist in May, 2000 
describing Africa as the Hopeless Continent, can be juxtaposed with a recent headline of 
Africa Rising by the same publication in December, 2011.  According to UNCTAD statistics, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to South Africa averaged only USD 1.9bn from 1994 
– 2012. In the previous 5 years, from 2008 – 2012, the average FDI has been USD 5.24bn.  
Although these numbers are relatively small and indicate room for improvement, 
investments are occurring and South Africa is holding its own. 
                                                          
33
 Cyril Ramaphosa was elected the deputy President of the ANC in 2012, which is expected remain control of 
the government after the next election.  He’s considered one of the wealthiest South Africans, and made his 
wealth through favourable BEE induced transactions with Coca-Cola, McDonalds and other prominent 
companies operating in South Africa.  Additionally, he was a key negotiator in the period leading up to the fall 
of the apartheid Nationalist government, and many believe and speculate that he was favoured by Nelson 
Mandela to follow him as the second democratically elected RSA President.  Many believe this development to 
be positive due to Cyril Ramaphosa’s pro-business leanings and prior history of doing business in South Africa 
with international partners. 
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Providing more clarity on this topic is the 2012 Deloitte & Touche and National Venture 
Capital Association (NVCA) report titled Global Trend in Venture Capital:  How Confident Are 
Investors?  In that, 440 survey responses were received from general partners with assets 
under management ranging from USD 50mn – USD 10bn.  72% of the responses came from 
non-US countries, and 70% were primarily engaged in venture capital.  When asked about 
the overall confidence in investing in various regions and countries, here are the responses 
from the US and UK firms: 
 










United States 3.87 1 3.56 1 
Brazil 3.51 2 3.54 2 
China 3.33 3 3.27 6 
Israel 3.24 4 3.00 8 
Canada 3.24 5 2.93 9 
Australia 3.03 6 3.20 7 
India 3.01 7 3.40 4 
Singapore 2.96 8 2.80 10 (tie) 
Taiwan 2.83 9 2.70 12 (tie) 
United Kingdom 2.74 10 3.32 5 
Germany 2.44 11 3.42 3 
South Africa 2.25 12 2.80 10 (tie) 
Japan 2.19 13 2.70 12 (tie) 
France 1.90 14 2.58 14 
(Source:  2012 Deloitte & Touche and NAVCA report on investor confidence) 
 
While South Africa didn’t rank in the top tier of investor confidence inducing countries, it 
was seen as more favourable than Japan and France for US investors.  The UK respondents 
stated that South Africa was tied with Singapore in confidence inducing, beating out Japan, 
Taiwan and France.   The aforementioned Economist headlines, UNCTAD data on FDI flows 
and the Deloitte & Touche survey results indicate that the perceptions of the investment 
opportunity in South Africa (and Africa at large) are improving and that many investors 
comprehend and are willing to accept these risks. 
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Irrespective of whether negative perceptions of Africa and South Africa are a material factor 
in constraining international syndications, there does seem to be work required in the area 
of dispelling negative stereotypes and reminding foreign investors of the positive aspects of 
doing business and investing in South Africa.  More useful and reliable data, and evidence of 
prior profitable early-stage investments are required.  Documenting and reporting early-
stage investment success stories in a more sophisticated, open and complete way is a good 
place to start.  The data and figures available to tell those and other stories are lacking.  For 
example, the most comprehensive report on the private equity and venture capital 
industries each year in South Africa are compiled and presented by KPMG, and supported by 
SAVCA.  KPMG is primarily an auditing firm, and many of its clients are the firms and funds 
interviewed.  Additionally, as an auditing firm it may not be in the best position to analysis 
and compile this very important data.  The lack of reliable and useful data is confirmed by 
this researcher while researching and completing this academic research.   
 
6.3.3 Small Deal Size 
According to the MoneyTree Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA), in 2012 US venture capitalists invested USD 26.5bn in 
3,698 deals.  That is an average of USD 7.1mn per transaction.   In contrast, the 2012 SAVCA 
Venture Solutions VC survey shows that from 2009 to the first half of 2012, there were 103 
venture capital transactions, with a value of ZAR 835mn invested over that period in the 
asset class.  That is an average of ZAR 8.11mn per transaction.  Assuming an exchange rate 
of 10/1, that is USD 811k per transaction, or nearly 9x smaller than the USD 7.1mn in the US.  
Admittedly, Silicon Valley34 is a juggernaut and hasn’t been repeated elsewhere in the US, or 
world.  A table comparing the two markets: 
 




# of Investments 
Avg. Deal Size 
(USD) 
South Africa (2009 - 2012) 83.5mn 103 811k 
United States (2012) 26.5bn 3698 7.1mn 
          (Sources:  2012 SAVCA Venture Solutions VC survey and NVCA database) 
                                                          
34
 As a rule of thumb based on near-term historic data, it usually account for approximately half of the total 
capital invested into the asset class, and a third of the total deals in the US.   
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Perhaps more important than average deal size, is average fund size in terms of effects on 
inducing syndications.  A primary driver of syndicating is to diversity a portfolio (Locket & 
Wright, 2000; Manigart et al., 2006).  If a syndicated investment is too small to move the 
needle and impact the character of a portfolio, the motivation to syndicate is necessarily 
reduced.  According to the NVCA database35, at the end of 2012 in the US there were 4,716 
venture capital funds holding USD 548.6bn of capital, representing an average venture 
capital fund size of USD 116mn.   To put that into perspective, one average sized US venture 
capital fund could have made all venture capital investments in South Africa from 2009 to 
2012 and still have USD 32.5mn of remaining capital.36 
 
Based on that quick survey of the US venture capital industry, the concerns cited by the 
interviewees are largely justified that small deal sizes in South Africa could be a constraining 
factor in influencing foreign investors to co-invest in South African ventures.  Apart from the 
reduced diversifying effect which smaller transactions have on a portfolio, there is also the 
issue of transaction costs to consider which are more of a concern to venture capital firms 
as they tend to be smaller funds with smaller management fees, relative to the larger 
private equity funds (Buckley et al., 1992; Meuleman & Wright, 2008).  When investing 
overseas, transaction costs necessarily increase for a variety of reasons.   The research 
shows that syndication can reduce those costs, but perhaps not always to the extent 
necessary to induce an investment.  As an example, a foreign firm contemplating an 
investment in a South African venture for the first time would likely insist on gaining an 
understanding of the local market, the selected management team and co-investment 
partners.  This would require man hours, flight time and potentially overwhelming amounts 
of research.  It may prove difficult to justify these costs unless the investment is truly 
exceptional, especially for a smaller sized deal.37 
 
A foreign firm contemplating an investment in South Africa for the first time could reduce 
those initial costs as described in the above example by having a South Africa strategy with a 
                                                          
35
 Available at:  http://www.quandl.com/NVCA-National-Venture-Capital-Association/VENTURE_1_04-Fund-
and-Firm-Analysis 
36
 Comparison illustrated to highlight a point and the calculation doesn’t include management fees, currency 
fluctuations, and other important variables. 
37
 Incidentally, if the aforementioned cream skimming effect is active in South Africa, exceptional deals are 
unlikely to have been presented to that international investor in the first place. 
77 | P a g e  
 
plan to make future investments (i.e., spreading those initial costs over multiple future 
investments), investing in large first deals (i.e., reduce the relative size of the initial costs 
relative to the first investment), or have a trusted partner on the ground (i.e., allow the local 
team to handle those functions and levels of analysis).  Whichever cost reduction strategy 
employed, it is quite clear that small deal size does have an impact on the difficultly of 
obtaining co-investment partners to South Africa, especially those who have not already 
absorbed the sunk costs of exploring and understanding the local investment landscape in 
South Africa and building the appropriate relationships. 
 
6.3.4 Low Quality Entrepreneurs and Lack of Bankable Deals  
The general consensus from the interviewees is that the entrepreneurs and management 
teams in South Africa are usually not as strong as those typically seen in the more developed 
markets.  The impact is that foreign investors may not be satisfied and thus balk at investing 
into those teams, or require substantial improvements and changes.  A term often used to 
describe the nature of the relationship between the investors and entrepreneurs in the 
interviews was hand holding.  By this, the respondents meant that local entrepreneurs and 
ventures require very close attention and support, especially in the early-stages of the 
investments.  This they felt could hinder internationally syndicated venture investment 
transactions due to increased monitoring and support costs, and a feeling that the amount 
of support and prodding required would not meet the expectations of the international 
investor.   It should be noted, however, that the respondents were all generally satisfied 
with the level of the entrepreneurs in their pipelines, and all felt that they had suitable deal 
flow of bankable (or near bankable) deals. 
Quantifying levels of entrepreneurialism in a society is challenging.  Widely touted in South 
Africa when discussing the local entrepreneurial climate is the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) report which is a report released annually by the University of Cape Town’s 
Graduate School of Business38.  The GEM survey is an international project in which 69 
countries participated in 2012, 10 of those were from sub-Saharan African countries.  The 
primary measure of entrepreneurialism in the sample countries is the Total Early-Stage 
                                                          
38
 The GEM study in South Africa is a part of a larger study of entrepreneurialism globally led by Babson College 
and London Business School. 
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Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) index.  The data which forms the TEA score comes from 
uniform surveys administered to a random sample of 2,000 adults in each participating 
country.  Other relevant data are used in the analysis to interpret and inform results.   
 
In 2012, GEM reported that South Africa had the lowest level of TEA in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and internationally ranked towards the bottom percentile.  A table from the 2012 report 
showing the relative ranking among other sub-Saharan African countries: 
 











activity (TEA) = 









Angola 15% 19% 32% 9% 26% 
Botswana 17% 12% 28% 6% 16% 
Ethiopia 6% 9% 15% 10% 3% 
Ghana 15% 23% 37% 38% 16% 
Malawi 18% 20% 36% 11% 29% 
Namibia 11% 7% 18% 3% 12% 
Nigeria 22% 14% 35% 16% 8% 
South Africa 4% 3% 7% 2% 4% 
Uganda 10% 28% 36% 31% 26% 
Zambia 28% 15% 41% 4% 20% 
Average 
(unweighted) 
15% 15% 28% 13% 16% 
          (Source: 2012 GEM report on South Africa) 
At first glance, the picture looks bleak for South Africa.  However, a survey of other 
countries with strong and innovate economies shows that the TEA measurement as used in 
the GEM studies may have limitations when trying to understand the type of entrepreneurs 
which are attractive to investors.  Gleanings from the GEM report showing TEA scores for 
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activity (TEA) = 









United States 9% 4% 13% 9% 4% 
Israel 4% 3% 7% 4% 4% 
UK 5% 4% 9% 6% 2% 
Germany 4% 2% 5% 5% 2% 
South Africa 4% 3% 7% 2% 4% 
Average 
(unweighted) 
5% 3% 8% 5% 3% 
          (Source: 2012 GEM report on South Africa) 
 
While South Africa ranks at the bottom in sub-Saharan Africa, it holds its own with these 
traditional powerhouses of innovation.  It is tied with Israel, beats Germany, and is not far 
off from the UK and US.  These confounding comparisons could be due to the broad 
definition of entrepreneurial activity which GEM utilizes.  The GEM data categorizes a Bill 
Gates like entrepreneur in with a person selling bananas on the street corner in Uganda.   
This could call into question the TEA score as a valid measure of the capacity of 
entrepreneurs in a country to create and manage businesses with the ability to scale 
internationally and attract investment from serious investors.  That proposition is supported 
by Lingelbach et al. (2009) where they argue that South African entrepreneurship is at a 
sufficient level to support a viable venture capital ecosystem, and that conclusion was 
derived after extensive interviews, surveys and analyses of the domestic venture capital 
ecosystem.  This interpretation of the GEM data is also confirmed by the findings from this 
research’s interviews where it was found that there is a perception of sufficient levels of 
capable entrepreneurs, even though they may require more hand holding than would be 
preferred. 
 
As this research report was concluding, a report from Ernst & Young (EY) was published 
which looked at entrepreneurialism in the G20 countries, of which South Africa is a member 
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(Ernst & Young, 2013).  Their findings paint a mixed picture.  On one hand, they found 
access to finance to be a lingering problem, and evidence that South Africa’s history of a lack 
of a culture of innovation39 and rigid labour laws were still taking their tolls.  On the other 
hand, South Africa has sound regulatory and tax processes for new businesses and starting a 
business is not very difficult.  South Africa also has a world class financial market and a 
strong base of middle class consumers.  When ranking the countries, South Africa fared well 
in the G20 and was in the second quartile of countries with Japan, Germany, France and the 
EU.   
 
Table 12:  EY 2013 Entrepreneurship Quartile Rankings 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Australia EU Brazil  Argentina 
Canada France China India 
South Korea Germany Mexico Indonesia 
United Kingdom Japan Russia Italy 
United States South Africa Saudi Arabia Turkey 
                (Source:  Ernst & Young 2013 Entrepreneurship Barometer report) 
 
There is, however, evidence which supports the proposition that low-quality entrepreneurs 
in South Africa are an issue in attracting international venture investors.  In the 2012 SAVCA 
Venture Solutions VC survey, when asked about the inhibitors to the success of venture 
capital funds in South Africa, lack of skilled entrepreneurs and suitable management teams 
for ventures were cited as the top two inhibitors.  These were followed by lack of exit 
mechanisms as the third most popular response.  Interestingly, in the previous survey, lack 
of entrepreneurs was not mentioned as an inhibitor.  The researchers squared those 
disparate results by explaining that the discrepancy could be justified by the increasing 
number of fund managers pursing the same number of ventures, and not to a decrease in 
the levels of entrepreneurial activity.  They believed the lack of suitable management teams 
and entrepreneurs was attributed to lack of exits and successful startups from which a pool 
of talent would naturally be developed and groomed.  Providing further support, based on 
surveys of local practitioners, Jones (2009) found deficiencies in South Africa’s 
entrepreneurs to be the third most important issue limiting venture capital in South Africa. 
                                                          
39
 Supported by dearth of significant research output and patent applications in South Africa. 
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Whether there is a perception of lack of skilled entrepreneurs to run startups in South 
Africa, or an actual shortage, the jury is still out.  The research in this area in South Africa is 
largely based on surveys and interviews of local practitioners and/or entrepreneurs.  These 
results are the impressions of participants in an ecosystem which is relatively 
underdeveloped.  As such, it’s not clear how insightful the aforementioned findings are to 
understanding South African entrepreneurs in an international context, and whether they 
would inhibit international investors from investing with local co-investors into those 
ventures.   The GEM data is the closest attempt to achieve that understanding, however as 
described it likely has limited applicability to understanding the type of entrepreneurs which 
would be attractive to sophisticated international investors. 
7 Conclusion 
This research set out to analyse the South African venture capital ecosystem, and 
specifically to assess the readiness and willingness of the local practitioners to syndicate 
internationally.  Additionally, this research sought to ascertain and explain the constraints to 
international syndication in South Africa.  This researcher found evidence to suggest that 
South African venture capitalists are ready and willing to syndicate internationally.  They 
have a high motivation to syndicate with their colleagues overseas and they see the value in 
syndicating internationally.   The primary categories of value which resonated, and were 
thus unpacked in this research, were access to new markets, expertise and knowledge 
sharing, stamp of approval and access to capital markets outside of South Africa.  The body 
of international research in this area has also identified and described these categories 
either directly or indirectly.   
 
The fact that South African venture investors comprehend these benefits, and express a 
high motivation to syndicate internationally suggests that the practitioners in the local 
ecosystem are ready and willing to syndicate internationally.  However, there are caveats to 
that general conclusion which this research addresses.  These caveats may cast some doubt 
on the readiness and willingness assertion, and also help to indicate areas to be explored in 
future research.  Those caveats are firstly that there is evidence that South African investors 
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may be inclined to withhold the best deals from their international investor colleagues.  
Second, South African venture investment managers may be focused on too many factors 
other than IRR so as to be a deterrent to attracting international conventional co-
investment partners.  Lastly, the benefit of increased on-going commitment in 
internationally syndicate backed ventures was not raised in the interview responses, which 
although not likely a material omission was worth exploring. 
 
From the interviews much guidance was proffered as to what the possible constraints to 
international syndication are in a South African context.  Also shaping the analysis and 
selection of possible constraints to explore further were a number of primary and secondary 
sources.  After eliminating constraints which are familiar to most international transactions 
in general, this researcher found the following constraints to be material and thus suitable 
for further analysis: unsupportive regulatory environment, negative perceptions of Africa 
and South Africa, small deal sizes, and lack of quality entrepreneurs/bankable deals. 
 
This research makes several contributions to the literature.  First, this is the first known 
piece of research to address the relatively young body of research in the field of 
international syndication of venture capital investments in a South African or African 
context.  To this researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine the suitability of a 
county’s venture capital ecosystem for international syndication.  It is also the first to 
address regulatory and other constraints inherent to a country which could inhibit these 
transactions.  The approach taken in this research was pragmatic, making the final research 
document a tool for practitioners and policy makers to make these transactions more 
common and likely to occur in the future. 
 
Second, this research is the first known piece to address the impact of indigenisation 
measures (e.g., BBBEE) on internationally syndicated venture capital transactions.  In that 
analysis, this research also coined a term for the first time as known to this researcher, and 
that term is emigrate or innovate.  Emigrate or innovate describes the situation in which 
many white male South Africans find themselves, and the impact of that situation on South 
Africa’s venture capital ecosystem and suitability as a place for internationally syndicated 
transactions described.  These findings should be particularly interesting to policy makers 
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and individuals who want to foster entrepreneurial support in a manner which will have a 
real impact, and also those who have as one of their aims to empower in a meaningful 
manner those from previously disadvantaged categories in South Africa. 
 
Third, the findings herein suggests that the GEMs data may be wholly inadequate as a tool 
of measuring the type of entrepreneurial activity in a country which is attractive to 
investors.  This researcher has found no other mention in prior academic research of this 
limitation, and as such this research is perhaps the first to call the utility of the GEMs data 
into question when using it to make business and investment decisions.     
 
Fourth, this is the first piece of known research which describes what impact exchange 
controls and other similar regulations can have on internationally syndicated venture capital 
transactions.  The findings can provide more clarity to practitioners trying to avoid the 
negative effects of such regulations, and also to regulators looking to craft regulations which 
don’t harm the ability of South Africa to attract international direct investments into local 
ventures and entrepreneurs. 
 
Fifth, this research offers the first review of the literature on the topic of venture capital in 
South Africa.  By placing all of the research in that field in one chapter, it is now possible for 
future researchers to quickly comprehend the current state of research and to identify 
possible gaps where that researcher can make contributions. 
 
Lastly, South African private equity and venture capital funders often have social impact and 
other governmental and governance objectives.  There is a chance that the attention away 
from solely an IRR-based objective could pollute an investment ecosystem and could go a 
long way in explaining the relative lack of success of South Africa’s venture capital 
investments.  International and serious investors are IRR focused, and the differing 
paradigms could also make co-investing with investors from a developmental aid frame of 
reference challenging.  This research is the first known piece to look, albeit in a glancing 
fashion, at that phenomenon and apply it to a cross-border venture capital investment 
analysis. 
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This researcher hopes the findings, efforts, and long hours of researching and writing inspire 
new research in the field of international syndication of venture capital investments in a 
South African or other context.  The objective of such research should  be to open up the 
international capital markets to South African entrepreneurs, allow foreign investors to 
participate directly in the African growth story, provide co-investment support to local 
investors, and increase the likelihood of more truly exceptional and global companies 
forming in South Africa and other developing markets.  This is a win-win proposition and a 
pursuit which can have substantial long-lasting and near-term impacts in places like South 
Africa. 
8 Recommendation for Future Studies 
The findings of this research offer a multitude of insights into future areas of study. 
 
First, a deeper understanding of the ability of South African ventures to scale internationally 
is important.  The local market is relatively small, and developed world investors will likely 
want the venture to tap into other markets quickly.  A longitudinal study of these ventures, 
looking at constraints to growth, actual sales growth, and other variables would offer 
interesting conclusions.  This research is available on more developed markets, which would 
offer the South African researcher the template to conduct the research and a benchmark 
from which to draw conclusions.  
 
Second, this research focused on South African practitioners considering international 
investment and their views on these transactions.  Also useful would be a similar study of 
international investors looking at their perceptions of internationally syndicating with South 
African investors and ventures.  In this vein, the only missing party from the analysis would 
be the entrepreneurs and management teams.  Furthering the understanding of these three 
parties to internationally syndicated venture backed transactions could provide much 
insight. 
 
Third, the networks of firms are shown to have the capacity to increase the business 
prospects and returns of ventures into which they invest.  What about the 
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interconnectedness of venture capital fund managers with other fund managers?  Do the 
presence of these relationships have a material effect on the likelihood of syndication, and 
the ultimate success of those syndicated backed deals?  If found to be material, one could 
conclude that well connected venture capitalists are better backers of ventures as they are 
more easily able to access future funding (through attracting more investors) and strategic 
partners as the venture develops. 
 
Fourth, the research in South Africa on the type of entrepreneurs that investors want to 
understand and back is lacking.  The GEM data is interesting, but largely insufficient for 
these purposes for reasons described in the body of this research.   
 
Fifth, exchange controls were cited as a primary impediment to enticing international 
investors to co-invest in South African ventures.  The review of available literature on the 
topic confirms those findings.  More research is needed to understand the impact of 
exchange controls (and IP protections) on these internationally syndicated transactions.   
 
Sixth, the discussion in this research on the impact of BBBEE suggests that the codes aimed 
at correcting the injustices of the past could be in fact harming entrepreneurialism in South 
Africa, especially as it pertains to the categories of people these codes are aimed at lifting 
up.  One way of many to study this phenomenon is to use Lingelbach et al. (2009) and their 
work as an underpinning.  In that, they attribute the fall of venture capital in South Africa to 
the weakening relationships (embeddedness) between the government (mostly black) and 
the venture capital participants (mostly white).  What about today, do these findings still 
hold and do they offer support for this model of venture capital emergence?   Are the BBBEE 
codes (assuming they are having the effect of increasing entrepreneurial activity among the 
white population, and discouraging it in the black population) making venture capital less 
likely to emerge? 
 
Seventh, the international literature is hollow in the area of risks and constraints to cross-
border syndication.  Given the youth of the research into the internationally syndicated 
venture capital investments, it’s logical that the first bits of research would focus on benefits 
and drivers of the activity.  This research takes an early step towards understanding the 
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phenomenon by identifying some constraints and impediments to international syndication 
in a South African context.  
 
Eighth, Lerner (2012) warns governments against making direct investment and other 
decisions to support an entrepreneurial ecosystem.  South Africa has historically behaved 
largely in ways proscribed by such research, and there is no documentation known to this 
researcher on the successes and failures attributable to the South African government’s 
interventions to improve the domestic ecosystem.   Credible research in this area would not 
only be novel, it would also have significant potential to sway legislative decisions moving 
forward.  
 
Ninth, as the sample in this research was relatively small due to forces outside the control of 
this researcher (i.e., nascent venture ecosystem in South Africa, et al.), a future similar study 
of venture professional at a time when the industry is more mature could produce results 
which either confirm or contradict the findings herein. The fact that the local practitioners 
haven’t been involved in many transactions may limit the usefulness of their responses in 
drawing conclusions on the local ecosystem and it’s suitability as a place ready for early 
stage international syndication activity. 
9 Policy Suggestions 
There is much that can be done from a public policy standpoint to foster and develop a 
more supportive environment within South Africa to attract more internationally syndicated 
venture capital investment activity.  Obviously, elected and appointed leaders have to view 
each issue with a multi-focal lens, whereas this research and these policy suggestions have 
the luxury of excluding other important considerations from the analysis such as righting the 
wrongs of the past, creating a more equitable environment, effective tax policy, and others.   
 
The respondents were asked what could be done to facilitate more internationally 
syndicated investments in South Africa, and their responses were helpful.  They said that 
locals don’t broadcast their success stories well and attributed this to cultural modesty or 
some other factors.  Additionally, there aren’t active programmes to facilitate connections 
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with foreign investors, or even to the diaspora living abroad.  These people are often in a 
position to make or sway investment decisions in their new country of domicile.  Lastly, they 
indicated that more research is required into the local industry and transactions to not only 
be able to make better domestic investment decisions, but also to more easily tell the 
domestic investment story to foreign investors.  The more precisely and accurately that 
story can be told, they believed, the more likely it is that foreigners will invest and that 
when they do invest the required risk premium lower. 
 
With those points in mind, below is a list of policy suggestions. 
 
First, IP protections should be de-linked from exchange control legislations and thus making 
it freer to flow out of South Africa.  A South African appellate court agreed and in the early-
2000s held that to be the case, which was shortly followed by the enactment of legislation 
with verbiage to directly include IP under the prevue of the SARB control.  By allowing IP to 
leave the country the incentive to invest in developing IP in South Africa is increased by both 
domestic and international investors.     
 
Second, exchange controls could be eliminated altogether making the first point moot.  
Although the controls have been loosened since the ANC took over the government, this 
research shows there may be more work remaining.  Exchange controls have the effect of 
limiting foreign investment, domestic investment, and hampering the ability of South 
African companies to transact outside of the country.  
 
Third, much of the support provided by the South African government is through making 
actual investment decisions into South African ventures and businesses.  The track record of 
these investments, coupled with research from such people as Lerner (2012), indicate that 
this is not an effective use of government resources.  South African public policy should 
probably steer away from making the decisions of which ventures to fund, and instead act 
to create an environment where the businesses can flourish. 
 
Fourth, there is very little data being collected on investment transactions, and those data 
which are available are often compiled by companies with their own interests and whose 
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core competencies aren’t data collection and analysis.  More financial and academic support 
should be applied to these measures.  The US and other developed markets do a fine job of 
this, and many of the strategies used by foreign companies and governments to this aim 
would be instructive. 
 
Fifth, as indicated in the interviews, relationships with international investors and South 
African investors are lacking.  By encouraging and facilitating those relationships, one would 
expect more international investors to invest in South Africa.  One way to approach this 
problem is to create an exchange programme whereby prominent international venture 
capitalists can spend time with South African investors.  These relationships will form the 
basis for future internationally syndicated deals and build goodwill and trade ties between 
South Africa and other powerful trading partners.  The benefits of those relationships in 
reducing transaction costs and encouraging co-investment is described previously and 
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Appendix 1 – Interview Questions 
 
Background (Demographics): 
Name of company and/or Fund(s)_______________________________________ 
1. Position of person 
interviewed:__________________________________________________ 
2. How many years has your Firm/Fund invested in early-stage 
investments:________________ 
3. How many investment professionals work for your firm? 
4. What is the size of your fund (AUM)? 
a. R10mn – R30mn 
b. R30mn – R70mn 
c. R70mn – R150mn 
d. R150mn+ 
5. What stage do you invest (circle all that apply)? 
a. Seed funding - (initial capital to start the business) 
b. Start-up capital - (Early funding used for setting up operations (hiring staff, 
renting office space, equipping the production system, etc.), commercializing 
intellectual property, and other activities.) 
c. Development capital  - (Finance used after start-up capital to further launch 
the business and grow market share in order to become profitable.)  
d. Growth capital - (Equity type investments used to assist established but still 
high-risk ventures in expanding activity such as launching into foreign 
markets, creating new product/technology lines, accelerating production 
and/or acquiring competitors.) 
e. Buyout funding - (management buyout, management buy-in and 
replacement capital) 
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9. Have you ever been approached by an international firm to be a co-investment 
partner? 
10. Have you ever approached an international investor/firm to be a co-investment 
partner? 
 
International Syndication Interview Questions: 
Questions provide a general framework.  The interviewer will probe through further 









2. What are in your view the benefits for the international firm of having a local co-investor 
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Constraints 
3. What do you perceive to be the constraints to international investors co-investing with 
SA investors, into SA ventures? 
 
 
4. What would be your reservations to having international co-investors? 
 
 
5. What do you think the SA firms could do to attract more co-investors from the 
international investors?  What do they do well?  Where do they struggle? 
 
 
6. What do you think international firms could do to increase their chances of co-investing 
with SA firms, into SA ventures?   Where do they need to improve?  What is their best 
chance of gaining the cooperation and interest from SA investors? 
 
Motivations 
7. Please explain the rationale behind your firm’s reluctance, or conversely, support of 
engaging with international investors to co-invest in South African ventures. 
 
 
8. When you consider syndicating with developed countries, does your analysis of what 
we’ve discussed in this interview change based on the country of origin of the 
firm/fund? If so, how?  If not, why do you perceive country of origin to not be a material 
factor? 
 
